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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Lori Kinder MacArthur for the Master of Science in Political 
Science presented November 3, 1995. 
Title: John Rawls, Feminism, and the Gendered Self. 
John Rawls's theory of justice, which he calls "justice as fairness," has proven to 
be most influential with regard to the course of contemporary political theory. In both of 
Rawls's books, A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, his aim was to present a 
theoretically-compelling defense of deontological liberalism, and to present a set of 
principles by which to fairly order a just society. 
While Rawls's project has attracted a fair number of proponents over the years, it 
has also been a popular target for liberal and nonliberal critics alike. A recurrent theme 
among these criticisms has been an objection with Rawls's conception of the self as 
presented in A Theory of Justice. 
This thesis will focus on frmini'..lls' criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons. 
In general, feminists contend that Rawlsian liberalism suffers a structural gender bias 
resulting from Rawls's conception of the self. Rawls's notion of the self, feminists argue, 
rests on male or masculine attributes. 
I will demonstrate in the course of this thesis that feminists' charges fail on two 
accounts. First, feminists do not present an accurate reading of Rawls's conception of 
persons in either A Theory of Justice or Political Liberalism. Second, in reviewing 
feminist approaches to gendering the self (which is integral to their critique), it will be 
shown that feminists are unable to gender the self in a theoretically defensible manner. 
Thus, feminists cannot make the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine 
concept. It follows from these twin defects that feminist contentions fail to prove that 
Rawls's theory is gender biased. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During recent years, partisans and critics alike have acknowledged the magnitude 
of John Rawls's contribution to contemporary moral and political theory. 1 His renown is 
largely the result of A Theory of Justice-a work that served as the first systematic 
account of his theory of justice, otherwise denominated "justice as fairness," which can 
be broadly regarded as a theoretical defense of "deontological" liberalism. 2 Since this 
publication, the corpus of his work has been steadfastly devoted to the advancement and 
clarification of "justice as fairness," and has been driven by the explicit intention of 
remaining faithful to "the spirit and content of A Theory of Justice ."3 
In political theory, it has been observed that Rawls's venture yielded three 
noteworthy effects that have influenced the course of the discipline. Of Rawls's 
contributions meriting comment the first is perhaps the most profound: A Theory of 
1
While "political theory" and "political philosophy" are often used interchangeably, the preference 
of the author is towards the fonner term as it is generally observed to be both broader in scope and more 
closely linked with the discipline of political study. On these related points, see John Gunnell, Political 
Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1987), xiv; and 
Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), 22. 
2
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971 ). NB: Hereafter, A 
Theory of Justice will also be referred to as Theory, with the latter title denoting the former. As defined by 
Rawls, in Theory (30), a "deontological theory" is "one that either does not specify the good independently 
from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good." Or more commonly stated, the right 
is given priority over the good. 
3John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), xiv. 
2 
Justice signaled a renaissance within political theory during the 1970s, with the project 
itself being the primary inspiration animating this movement. 
For many, Rawls was perceived to have undertaken in Theory "a project of heroic 
proportion and classical: articulating a comprehensive and universal theory of justice 
founded on first principles."4 The publication of this work seemed to mark not only the 
restoration of political theorizing as a salient enterprise in the present-day study of 
politics-a project that had withered during the positivist ascendance of the 1950s and 
1960s-but it also signified, in the words of Amy Gutmann, that "grand political theory 
[was] once again alive in the academy."5 
Second, though there exists many historical and contemporary variants of 
liberalism, Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" has been regarded as one of the most 
theoretically-compelling and influential defenses of liberalism to date. Theory, in turn, 
has been judged the "paradigm statement of contemporary liberal theory ."6 
Third, Rawls' s project has been recognized as indelibly altering the conceptual 
framework of contemporary liberalism and-more broadly-the conventional lines of 
political discourse. Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift outline: 
4Patrick Neal, "Justice as Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?" Political Theory 18 (1990): 24. 
5 Amy Gutmann, "The Central Role of Rawls's Theory," Dissent (Summer 1989): 338. For a 
discussion of positivism in the discipline of political studies and history of political theory, see Gunnell, 
chap. I passim. 
6Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992), vii. 
his theory established the terrain upon which subsequent political-theoretical 
battles were to be fought...[so that both] critics and defenders of versions of 
liberalism other than that offered by Rawls have formulated their positions in 
terms that make explicit reference to his theory, so that in many ways Rawls 
simply did define the agenda and continues to do so.7 
All told, the standard terms of political inquiry (such as, equality, liberty, 
freedom, etc.) were essentially reinterpreted by Rawls's theory, so that the very 
conceptual premises and principles on which political theory operate have shifted. 
However the relative importance of the aforementioned factors are weighted, 
taken together they have indubitably secured for Rawls a central station within both 
3 
liberalism and, more broadly, political theory. Though many sympathize with Rawls, and 
ardently defend his theory of justice, the conspicuousness of Rawls's position has also 
attracted a fair number of detractors. Their criticisms range from specific objections to 
the principles of "justice as fairness," to more encompassing challenges intended to 
undermine the entirety of the liberal tradition. Nevertheless, the attentiveness of both 
critics and liberal adherents to this so-called nonpareil statement of liberalism makes 
evident the significance of Theory and Rawls's ongoing project to fashion a theoretically 
cogent version of deontological liberalism. 
In contemporary debate one recurrent point has loomed large in criticism of 
Theory, as Janet Moore explains, Rawls's "autonomous, self-conscious, and self-
constitutive subject has drawn heavy fire from feminist and other critical theorists, as well 
as structuralist, poststructuralist, and postmodern philosophers engaged in critiques of 
7Ibid., 1. 
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classical liberalism and its social contract theories."8 Much of the current controversy 
centering on Rawls's theory, spins around his liberal conception of the person. In 
examining a facet of this debate, this work will analyze feminists' criticisms of Rawls's 
conception of the person. Before delving into the fine points of this analysis, however, 
several preliminary considerations pertaining to the nature of feminist claims ought to be 
reviewed. 
Because feminist arguments are directed towards Rawls's conception of persons, 
the very term "person" or "self' is of interest.9 To clarify, feminist contentions are not 
directed at any generic definition of the self (i.e., the combination of those elements that 
we consider requisite to be human, such as body, thoughts, emotions, etc.); rather, they 
are concerned with the more controversial assumptions about the self (i.e., particular 
characteristics, interests, predispositions, nature, etc.) which are indeed subject to 
disparate interpretations. Feminists are thus concerned with Rawls's "interpretation" of 
the self. 
This aside, it seems as though the question of what constitutes an accurate 
interpretation of personhood would be a rather straightforward one. For theorists, 
however, the issue is a good deal more complex, and the way in which the question of 
personhood is answered is of consequence. The ontological commitments (i.e., 
8Janet Moore, "Covenant and Feminist Reconstruction's of Subjectivity within Theories of 
Justice," in Law and Contemporary Problems 55 (Summer 1992): 159. 
9Tue distinction, if any, between the term "person" and "self' is negligible; accordingly, the terms 
will be employed interchangeably. 
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interpretations of the self) of political theorists have important structural ramifications for 
their theories, because premises, concepts, principles and conclusions are-for the most 
part-rooted in their vision of persons. 
Recognizing the significance of this fact, feminists have been concerned with how 
political theorists interpret the self as it relates to women. Importantly, feminists have 
introduced the notion of gender into the discussion of the self in what seems an attempt to 
redefine the contemporary debate over the liberal self. Illustrative of this point, feminist 
Alison Jaggar maintains that: "[S]ince every political theory is grounded on a certain 
conception of human nature, each political theory incorporates some assumptions about 
the nature of women and men." 10 On the surface, this statement seems rather innocuous 
and unassuming; however, it reveals two fundamental points of departure introduced by 
feminists. First, when discussing the notion of the self, gender is considered a relevant 
factor. Second, this statement implies that men and women may have distinct natures that 
cannot simply be subsumed under the single, broad category of human nature. What 
J aggar and many other feminists conclude is that political theorists make assumptions 
about the self and, intentionally or not, make presumptions about the nature of men and 
women respectively. 
Although feminists hold that Rawls employs a specific notion of the self based on 
assumptions about the nature of persons, it should be noted from the outset that in 
Theory, Rawls does not specifically address gender, much less does he imply that women 
IO Jaggar, 21. 
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and men are either similar or distinct. Indeed, Rawls seems altogether reluctant to 
approach the issue of gender, or he is simply blind to the fact that women may possess a 
different nature than men. 
It is precisely this "silence" on the issue of gender that has been problematic for 
feminists, because in their view it implies "either that there are no differences between 
women and men that are relevant to political philosophy or that women are not part of the 
subject matter of political philosophy."11 The salient question then is whether Rawls's 
notion of the self applies only to men-in which case his assumptions of human nature, 
while seemingly generic, are only really indicative of man; or whether his notion of the 
self is applicable to either gender-in which case there is a single version of human 
nature common to both sexes. 
Many feminists have found neither answer to that question acceptable. It seems 
obvious why feminists would reject the first alternative: women would be excluded 
entirely from the scope of analysis. However, it is not immediately evident as to why 
feminists would chafe at the second alternative. While some feminists (namely 
traditional liberal feminists) reaffirm the gender-neutral account of human nature that 
appears to be on display in Rawls's theory of justice, the most common response by 
feminists has been to debunk the notion that the nature or experiences of women are akin 
to those of men. 12 Thus, they reject the gender neutral stance. 
111bid. 
12The strong thesis being that women's nature (i.e. biology) is essentially different, the weak 
thesis being that women's social experiences (i.e. social roles) are markedly divergent. 
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If this is the case-that the notion of the self is in some fashion gendered male or 
female-to which gendered self is Rawls's theory applicable? Feminists have primarily 
responded by arguing that the constitutive assumptions of the liberal self are based on 
male (or, as postmodern feminists say, masculine) values. 13 Liberal concepts of 
rationality, agency, and morality underlying this notion of personhood "have been 
defined exclusively in masculine terms." 14 Insofar as Rawls's theory is applied to women 
then, they are either excluded altogether or marginalized as a result of being "forced to 
think through their experience via male categories."15 
Rawls's seemingly gender-neutral approach to the conception of the self, for 
feminists, indicates a gender bias-albeit a bias more subversive and subtle than an 
explicit excJusion of women. Of feminists challenging Rawlsian liberalism, then, the full 
allegation is as follows: Rawlsian liberalism, similar to other variants of this political 
theory, exhibits a structural male gender bias, and this inherent prejudice rests on his 
conception of the person. 16 Because Rawls's theory is grounded on an exclusionary 
13
The use of the term "male" denotes more of a biological position, while the term "masculine" 
denotes "not a biological category but a cognitive style, and epistemological stance." See Susan Bordo, 
"The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 11, no. 3 
(Spring 1986): 451. 
14
Susan J. Hekman, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of Postmodern Feminism (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1990), 34. 
15
Beverly Thiele, "Vanishing act in social and political thought: Tricks of the trade," in Feminist 
Challenges: Social and Political Theory, ed. Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1987), 42. 
16
Sinopoli makes a similar note, claiming that feminist arguments of "structural gender bias in 
liberal political thought (at least in the social contract tradition) deriving from a liberal conception of the 
8 
vision of the self, say feminists, he effectively denies true representation of women in his 
analysis. 
For students of political theory, it is common knowledge that Rawls has 
responded to other critiques of his conception of the self, specifically those advanced by 
the communitarian camp. Rawls has not issued a parallel rejoinder to feminist critics, 
however. While Rawls did recently claim "that the alleged difficulties in discussing 
problems of gender ... can be overcome," he has not expound upon this assertion. 17 Given 
that this is the case, why Rawls's silence with regard to feminist criticisms? Perhaps 
Rawls does not find feminist critiques theoretically credible, and thus unworthy of a 
response. Then again, he may have neither the time nor the interest necessary to issue a 
rejoinder. The reason as to why a dialogue matching the communitarian-liberal debate 
has not emerged between Rawls and the feminists in the end is left open to conjecture. 
It is plausible to suggest, however, that this absence of debate is to some degree a 
reflection of the fact that liberal political theory and feminism are considered separate, 
distinct disciplines or cannons of thought. 18 "Feminist theory and political theory are 
often treated as if they operated in two separate worlds," notes Nancy Hirschmann. 
self,". See Richard C. Sinopoli. "Feminism and Liberal Theory," in American Political Science Review 85, 
no. 1(March1991): 223. 
17 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxix. 
18The author's inclination is to refer to political theory as a discipline, and feminists theory as a 
cannon of scholarship or thought. 
9 
"[B ]ut if they are in two worlds, it is not because they are inherently opposed but rather 
because there are very few people who speak both languages." 19 
This comment-that there exist two languages that must be transcended prior to a 
meaningful dialogue-unmasks another potential obstacle. That is, these two languages 
may be rooted in two entirely different paradigms, each based on irreconcilable 
foundational assumptions and mutual1y-unintelligible conceptual frameworks. 20 Indeed 
much of feminist theory has attempted to move beyond the theoretical confines of 
liberalism, but according to Hirschmann the problem is that "by circumventing [liberal 
theory] and setting up [feminist theory's] own assumptions and conceptual framework, 
feminist theory becomes incomprehensible in the epistemology that liberalism defines."21 
Reflexively, feminist theory may have become equally incomprehensible to liberal 
theorists. If this is the case-that liberal and feminist theory, in some sense, represent 
two divergent paradigms-then discussing the two may be more troublesome than one 
might initially expect. 22 
19
Nancy J Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation: A Feminist Method For Political Theory (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1992), 24. Richard Sinopoli, in "Feminism and Liberal Theory" (231 ), 
makes a similar argument by claiming that "political scientists cannot be expected to be familiar with 
[feminist] literature". 
2°For a discussion of the term "paradigm" and what is involved in "paradigm debates," refer to 
Thomas S. Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1970), passim. 
21
Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation, 26. 
22
0n this point, in Scientific Revolutions ( 109-110), Kuhn suggests that when two "schools 
disagree about what is a problem and what [is] a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when 
debating the relative merits of respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result. 
each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a 
few of those dictated by its opponent." Thus, "logical contact" between two paradigms is problematic. 
10 
Any attempt at constructing a dialogue between feminism and liberalism will 
necessarily confront the task of bridging the two languages. This may require the mere 
harmonization of the two different languages, or it may entail the more formidable task of 
transcending the cognate paradigms of liberalism and feminism. This brings us to the 
most general aim of the thesis: I intend to push the discussion beyond what could amount 
to an impasse of "disagreement" and to initiate a dialogue of "critical" inquiry between 
feminist theorists and Rawls.23 
More specifically, the purpose of this inquiry is to explore the contours of feminist 
contentions with Rawls' s liberal conception of the self and, in so doing, provide a critical 
analysis of the theoretical cogency and aptness of these criticisms. I will argue that 
feminist challenges to Rawls fail in two interrelated ways. First, feminist criticism is 
based on overdrawn and incorrect interpretations of Rawls's conception of persons. 
Second, feminists' arguments that posit the liberal conception of persons to be 
characteristically male or masculine are based on dubious evidence, at best. All told, 
feminist contentions do not correctly address the shortcomings of the Rawlsian self; 
23Jerry Cederblom and David W. Paulsen make an important distinction between the terms 
"disagreement" and "critical reasoning" which aptJy apply here: "When one person asserts a position and 
another merely denies it, or states an opposing position, this is disagreement, and it is indeed 
commonplace ... Critical reasoning, however, is a process that involves looking at the reasons on which an 
opposing view is based and making an assessment of those reasons. Its immediate aim is to determine 
whether the position offered is worth believing, but it is also a basis for further inquiry and discussion which 
may move both participants to a better understanding of the issue at hand." See Jerry Cederblom and David 
W. Paulsen, Critical Reasoning (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1986), 1. 
therefore, it can be shown that Rawls's conception of justice has the requisite theoretical 
resources to respond to feminist assertions. 
The Method, Concepts, and Contours of Inquiry 
Although the topic of inquiry lies at the crossroads between two disciplines or 
cannons of scholarship, this undertaking should be regarded as a work within the 
discipline of political theory. Presently, the dispute within academia over the proper 
scope and method of political theory, in juxtaposition to political science, has relented 
somewhat. Thus, the former line of demarcation between the study of political science 
(associated with logical positivism and the empirical goal of prediction) and political 
theory (linked with more normative and conceptual concerns) has been blurred.24 
Nevertheless, this inquiry treats issues that fall within the traditional purview of political 
theory; thus, it is methodologically fashioned by normative and conceptual analysis. 
11 
The remainder of this section will introduce and define for the reader concepts 
which together form the fabric and framework of the forthcoming analysis. These 
concepts include: ( 1) Feminist theory; (2) The gendered self; (3) Liberal political theory; 
and (4) Rawls's theories of "justice as fairness" and "political liberalism." By articulating 
the conceptual terrain in which this analysis is situated, and delineating the parameters of 
the debate, this section will thereby refine and narrow the scope of investigation. 
Feminist Theory 
24 
Gunnell, 10. 
12 
Feminist theory can be primarily understood "as a network of normative, 
conceptual, empirical and methodological claims," the aim of which is to provide a 
theoretical framework capable of: ( 1) describing women's oppression; (2) explaining the 
reasons for their oppression; and (3) providing a systematic political or social theory 
capable of women's liberation.25 Beyond this definition of feminist theory, however, 
conceiving of feminist thought as a coherent or unified cannon of thought is difficult. 
The stated goal of women's liberation, the amelioration of injustices done to 
women as a group, fails to provide any deeper cohesiveness of purpose for feminists. 
Indeed the ostensible solidarity of feminism is quickly riven asunder once we look 
beneath the superficial veneer of feminist consensus and recognize the wide range of 
feminist sub-versions: liberal feminism, Marxist liberalism, socialist feminism, radical 
feminism, postmodern feminism, existential feminism, and so on.26 While there is much 
overlap among feminist theories regarding the basic recognition that women have been 
and continue to be discriminated against based on their sex, the descriptive and 
explanatory accounts (and thus the prescribed paths to women's liberation) vary widely.27 
"5 - Jaggar, 9. 
26
The enumerated list of approaches to feminist theory appears in Rosemarie Tong's book, 
Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), I. 
27 On this issue, Jean Grimshaw states that simply because most feminists believe that "women are 
badly treated and that they suffer from systematic social injustice because of their sex, it does not follow 
from this that any consensus is available as to the precise forms this oppression or injustice takes, or as to 
how they should be remedied." See Jean Grimshaw, Feminist Philosophers: Women's Perspectives on 
Philosophical Traditions (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 20. 
13 
While feminists have made partial progress in the development of a theoretical 
route to women's liberation, they lament the fact that there exists a dearth of available 
comprehensive feminist political or social theories. Catherine MacKinnon explains: 
"Feminism has no theory of the state."28 Consequently, feminists have looked to 
mainstream political theories of state (e.g., liberalism, Marxism, socialism, etc.) as 
possible vehicles by which to achieve women's liberation. Despite this deficiency in 
feminist theory, the descriptive and explanatory principles alone (which feminist have 
proven prolific in generating) have facilitated feminism's rise to prominence as a method 
of critique. 
Given the above description of feminist theory, several relevant considerations 
ought to be addressed regarding the treatment of feminism in this inquiry. For the task at 
hand, feminist theory is perhaps best understood as a method of critique rather than as a 
rival political theory akin to Rawls's theory of justice.29 
Cognizant of the broad spectrum of ideas and theories existing within feminist 
thought, some limitations on the treatment of feminist theory must be imposed. While 
addressing only one version of feminist theory would limit the scope (and hence the 
value) of this project, an attempt to address feminist thought in all of its variegated forms 
is beyond the ambit of this inquiry. Subsequently, my approach to feminist theory will be 
28Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 157. 
290n this theme, see Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, "Introduction: Beyond the Politics of 
Gender," in Feminism as Critique, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 199 l ). 
14 
specifically organized around three distinguishable feminists' conceptions of the 
gendered self, which in large measure form the basis of their critiques of Rawls's notion 
of personhood. 
Lastly, this seems the proper place to explain why I will focus only on feminists' 
critiques of the liberal self. In general, feminists have devoted increasing attention to 
questions surrounding the notion of persons, as it effects both mainstream and feminist 
theoretical inquiry. As feminists have had to concede that their standard critiques against 
liberalism could be accommodated within the purview of contemporary liberal theory, the 
trend within feminism has been to refocus their critique by concentrating specifically on 
the liberal self; a critique they believe cannot be subsumed and amended within the 
liberal framework. 30 In addition, feminists have devoted much energy to exploring and 
developing their own conception of the gendered self, which they hope will prove 
superior to the allegedly gender-neutral liberal self. 31 Given these factors, I think the 
focus of inquiry is warranted, as feminist critiques of the liberal self are of central 
importance in comprehending the contemporary debate between liberals and feminists. 
3°For a brief discussion on this matter, see Benhabib and Cornell, 11. 
31 Though Okin has concentrated her efforts on critiquing the position of the family within liberal 
theory, she notes that "much feminist intellectual energy in the 1980s" has been devoted to developing a 
conception of the self different than that defined by Rawls and other liberal theorists. See Susan Moller 
Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 15. 
15 
The Gendered Self 
In conceptual terms, the notion that the self should be gendered in some fashion 
has been a leitmotiv in feminist writings; ironically, it is also a notion that has been a 
rising source of disagreement among feminists. Broadly speaking, the concept "gendered 
self' can be taken to mean a description of persons that attempts to identify and take into 
account relevant differences between the sexes-a conception of persons that is in some 
sense constituted by one's gender identity. While a few feminists have been reluctant to 
support gendering the subject in this way, the overwhelming majority of feminists have 
been inclined to support some notion of a gendered self. Even so, feminist interpretations 
of this notion have taken on different complexions. 
During the 1960s, feminists "pursued a traditional liberal model of equality, a 
model premised on the notion that women and men are in all important respects the same 
and should be treated the same."32 Today, this position is associated with traditional 
liberal feminists, or "sameness feminists," who reject the notion of the gendered self and 
instead "advocate gender-neutral categories that do not rely on gender stereotypes to 
differentiate between men and women."33 The implication of this gender-neutral 
approach is that the underlying commonality between men and women is highlighted and 
32 Anne C. Dailey, "Feminism's Return to Liberalism," The Yale Law Journal 102 (1993): 1267. 
33Joan C. WilJiams, "Deconstructing Gender," in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and 
Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 110. 
16 
privileged over any account of the self that is gender differentiated (i.e. the self exists 
prior to a self that is specifically gendered). 
During the early 1970s, many feminists began to reject the gender-neutral account 
of the self supported by traditional liberal feminism and found within liberal political 
theory, and instead emphasized the differences between the sexes. These feminists 
argued that the liberal notion of the self did not adequately take into account important 
sexual differences (i.e., biological, psychological, cultural, and/or epistemological) that 
exist between men and women. In turn, they began to question the ability of liberalism to 
implement equal opportunity if, in their view, the liberal model could not take into 
account relevant sexual differences in their description of the subject. No longer was 
feminist theory going to "aim for parity, equivalence, or disinterested treatment under the 
prevailing standards; rather, it starts from, and affirms, the difference between men and 
women."34 
Given this rejection of the gender-neutral approach to the self, the trend within 
feminism shifted toward what has been called the "difference approach," an approach that 
affirmed the notion of the gendered self. "The philosophy underlying the difference 
approach", explains MacKinnon, "is that sex is a difference, a division, a distinction, 
beneath which lies a stratum of human commonality, sameness."35 Juxtaposed with the 
34
Christine Sypnowich, "Justice, Community, and the Antinomies of Feminist Theory," Political 
Theory 21 (August 1993): 490. 
35
Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Difference and Dominance," in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in 
Law and Gender, eds. Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 
82. 
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neutral concept of the self explained above, the difference approach suggests that as 
persons we are gendered as women and men before any common humanity. In the view 
of these feminists, then, humans must be considered gendered selves and not simply 
gender-neutral selves-for gender-neutral selves deny the fundamental differences 
between men's and women's nature. The implication here is that the primary, 
fundamental determinant of our identity is gender. 
In the 1980s, this difference theme continued to resonate in feminist theory; 
however, it took an interesting new turn. Feminists were no longer simply debating the 
inherent differences between men and women, they were also considering important 
differences between women themselves. For many feminists, the definition of the 
"essential" woman of the 1970s appeared flawed, as it excluded a whole range of women 
whose characteristics varied according to experience, color, race, ethnicity, class, and 
other factors. This, in tum, launched a new series of conflicts among feminists coined 
"the essentialism-anti-essentialism debates."36 
Responding to charges of essentialism, the trend in feminist theory at present 
indicates a partial retreat from the 1970s idea of the gendered self. 37 In recoiling from 
36
Naomi Schor, "Introduction," in The Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth 
Weed (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), vii. 
37
Elizabeth Grosz defines essentialism as follows: "Women's essence is assumed to be given and 
universal and is usually, though not necessarily, identified with women's biology and "natural" 
characteristics. Essentialism usually entails biologism and naturalism, but there are cases in which women's 
essence is seen to reside not in nature or biology but in certain given psychological characteristics-
nurturance, empathy, supportiveness, non-competitiveness, and so on. Or Women's essence may be 
attributed to certain activities and procedures which may or may not be dictated by biology observable in 
social practices, intuitiveness, emotional responses, concern and commitment to helping others, etc. 
Essentialism entails the belief that those characteristics defined as women's essence are shared in common 
by a11 women at al times: it implies a limit on the variations and possibilities of change-it is not possible 
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this essentialist notion of the gendered self, however, many feminists have not advocated 
a return to the gender-neutral conception of persons. Instead they have attempted to 
dodge the charges of universalism and essentialism linked to the earlier notion of the self 
by describing the gendered self as a situated creature embedded within a particular 
historical, social and cultural context. 
In light of this history, three feminist approaches to the subject that dominate 
contemporary feminism can be delineated and thus will be considered in this analysis: 
cultural feminism, relational feminism, and postmodern feminism. 38 What "unites" these 
positions, argues Christine Sypnowich, is their "critique of the atomistic individual as a 
male construction with its roots in the Enlightenment and [their] suspicion of the 
masculine world of Cartesian epistemology, market contracts, impartial justice, equal 
rights, and indeed, we might add, political struggle itself."39 However, cultural, relational 
and postmodern feminism all take a somewhat different route to gendering the self. 40 
for a subject to act in a manner contrary to her nature." See Elizabeth Grosz, "Sexual Difference and the 
Problem of Essentialism," in The Essential Difference, eds. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 84. 
38
Feminist theorists have generally construed cultural feminism and relational feminism as one in 
the same. Indeed, there are important overlaps between relational and cultural feminism, however, I will 
make the distinction between the two. With regard to women's differences, relational feminism is more 
closely linked to biological accounts, while cultural feminism is associated with social accounts for 
explaining women's and men's differences. 
39
Sypnowich, 490. 
40
Tue position held by traditional liberal feminist and "sameness" feminists, as indicated earlier, 
wilJ not be discussed for obvious reasons. 
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For the purpose of this analysis, by identifying and delineating the differences that 
exist between feminist conceptions of the self, we will see which of these approaches 
proves to be not only the most fruitful for feminists in gendering the self, but also which 
approach proves to make best the claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine 
subject. 
Liberal Political Theory 
Marked by a long and successful history, the liberal tradition has undergone 
manifold transformations. Analogous to feminist theory, one finds across the terrain of 
liberalism's development many diverse variants of the theory. While there is some vague 
notion of liberty or freedom that appears to be threaded throughout all brands of 
liberalism, a comprehensive definition of liberalism seems elusive. Inasmuch as no 
single formulation of liberalism is inclusive of the spectrum of ideas present within the 
liberal tradition, often what counts as "liberal" is a source of disagreement among liberals 
themselves. 
Nevertheless, despite the debate over what the definitive principles of liberalism 
are, and the apparent lack of consensus among contemporary liberals, there are a set of 
underlying assumptions-grounded on twin conceptions of the person and society-
which have allowed liberalism to remain "an integral outlook."41 
41 
John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), xi. 
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Drawing on several liberal theorists, I will roughly outline the foundational tenets 
and assumptions found in contemporary liberalism. First, at the heart of contemporary 
liberal theory is the belief that all persons should be equally regarded as individual 
creatures of moral worth. It has followed from this that liberalism has been considered 
"individualistic, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of 
any social collectivity," and "egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same 
moral status."42 
The second assumption is that persons are beings who not only possess agency, 
but also actively "seek the capacity for agency."43 Liberal theorist Steven De Lue claims, 
"persons wish to define their own goals, develop their own talents, interests, and needs, 
and determine strategies for action that are effective means to attain self-determined 
purposes. ,,44 
Many liberal theorists, such as Rawls, have posited this assumption in terms of 
"the good": the assumption is that all persons have "a conception of their good" and thus 
want to lead a life that is good by pursuing their own self-defined vision of the good.45 
Moreover, the actions of persons, notes Bruce Ackerman, "cannot be understood apart 
42
Ibid., x. 
43
Steven M. De Lue, "The Idea of a Duty to Justice in Ideal Liberal Theory," in Liberals on 
Liberalism, ed. Alfonso J. Damico (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 97. 
44
1bid. 
45
Rawls, Theory, 19. 
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from their conceptions of the good. "46 One's conception of the good is in some fashion 
constitutive of her identity. 
The strategy with which we come to lead a good life is not a static process, 
however. As persons capable of agency, we consider and may even revise our conception 
of the good based on different experiences and access to information. These 
"deliberations," notes Will Kymlicka, are not simply a method for determining the most 
effective means for achieving our immediate goals, they are also "judgments about the 
value of those ends and projects. and we recognize that our current or past judgments are 
falli b 1e."47 
Third, in order for people to lead a life that is good, several preliminary factors 
must be secured. As individuals, we must be willing to "lead our life from the inside, in 
accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life."48 In addition, the social 
scheme must be able to secure the essential freedom and resources necessary "to question 
those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and 
arguments our culture can provide. "49 Thus, the social scheme must ensure equal liberty 
for all persons to pursue their conceptions of the good as well as ensuring that "all 
persons are provided the basic primary goods (such as rights and liberties, equality, self-
46 
As quoted by Richard E. Flathman, Towards a Liberalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1989), 49. 
47Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 11. 
481bid., 13. 
49
Ibid. 
respect, income and wealth) necessary for an agency-centered life."50 (Of course, what 
constitutes "equal liberty" and "basic primary goods" has been subject to wide 
interpretation.) 
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This definition should not be considered an exhaustive one; rather my purpose is: 
( 1) To provide a general framework of some of the defining features of liberalism in 
which to situate the forthcoming analysis; (2) To highlight some of the foundational 
assumptions that undergird Rawls's liberalism; and (3) To bring attention to the difficulty 
of treating liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine (i.e., beyond a select set of 
assumptions). As Kymlicka warns: "Different critics of 'the liberal tradition' are often 
attacking different targets-some discussions are directed at the articulated premises or 
specific liberal theorists, others at the habits and predispositions of liberal-minded 
politicians and jurists, yet others at some more nebulous world-view which underlies 
Western culture generally, not just our political tradition."51 Heeding Kymlicka' s caveat, 
my concern will be in evaluating feminist criticisms of Rawls's conception of the person 
and determining whether their interpretation can correctly be attributed to his version of 
liberalism. 
50
De Lue, 97. 
51 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, 9. 
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John Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism 
As noted, the breadth of the liberal tradition is great, and Rawlsian liberalism is 
simply one version among many. I submitted, however, that Rawls's Theory is of central 
importance in contemporary liberalism given the fact that this has been the pole around 
which liberals rally and the magnet of criticism for non-liberals. Accordingly, Rawls 
presents one of the most representative versions of liberalism-the version of liberal 
political theory from which I will mount my defense of liberal conceptions of the self 
against feminist claims of gender bias. 
In approaching Rawls's work, however, an important distinction must be drawn 
between "justice as fairness" (hereafter referred to as JAF) and "political liberalism." 
Since the publication of Theory, Rawls published a series of articles that later culminated 
in the publication in 1993 of Political Liberalism. The significance of this book's 
production is that it seemed to signal a partial departure by Rawls from JAF. While the 
salience of this alteration is an open question, as Mulhall and Swift explain, "it is 
sufficient to make the point that Rawls himself clearly regards the significant change as 
that which now makes the theory a specifically political conception of justice, or a 
specifically political brand of liberalism."52 By emphasizing the political, Rawls has 
attempted to shift JAF away from being considered a comprehensive moral doctrine 
whose universalism transcends specific historical or cultural embodiments to a more 
contextualized theory of justice. For our purposes, then, JAF will refer to Rawls's theory 
52
Mulhall and Swift, 168. 
of justice as defined in Theory, and political liberalism will refer to the Rawls's later 
work on JAF (i.e., JAF as a distinctly political theory of liberalism). 
The Direction of Inquiry 
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The structure of this analysis is designed to address the question of whether 
Rawls's conception of the self is defensible against feminist charges of gender bias. In 
accordance with the stated purpose, then, the contents of the chapters are as follows. The 
analysis begins in chapter two with an expository discussion of Rawls's conception of 
justice as developed in Theory and in Political Liberalism. My purpose here is threefold. 
In the first section, I will present a brief and elementary introduction of Rawls's project of 
JAF as articulated in Theory. In the second section, I will draw out a list of themes that 
both reflect Rawls's conception of persons, and also the issues that I will later focus upon 
in discussing feminists' critiques of this notion. The third section will take up the themes 
detailed in second section and review how these have been altered by Rawls's political 
liberalism. 
Next, chapter three will delineate specific feminist objections to the liberal 
conception of the person. Having identified these contentions, chapter four and chapter 
five will be devoted largely to evaluating the cogency of these critiques. In chapter four, I 
will be concerned with evaluating whether feminists have correctly interpreted Rawls's 
liberal notion of persons in either JAF or in political liberalism. In light of Rawls's shift 
to political liberalism and his development of a new political conception of persons, I will 
evaluate whether Rawls's conception of persons in Theory or in Political Liberalism is 
best able to counter feminists contentions. 
In chapter five, I will be concerned with the success of feminists in gendering the 
self, and whether they prevail in proving that Rawls's notion of the self is male or 
masculine gendered. The issue of gendering the self is of chief importance for feminist 
arguments directed at the Rawlsian self. If feminists are unable to articulate a set of 
gender-based attributes (i.e., gender the self), they will necessarily lack the theoretical 
tools neccesary for making the subsequent claim that the Rawlsian self is male or 
masculine. I will conclude, then, by reviewing where feminists critiques have failed at 
proving Rawls's conception of the self (as articulated in Theory or Political Liberalism) 
is gender biased. 
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CHAPTER II 
JOHN RAWLS'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF: 
FROM A THEORY OF JUSTICE TO POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the liberal conception of the self has figured 
prominently in feminist contentions with-and rejections of-liberal political theory. 
This chapter's aim is to review how the notion of persons is framed in Rawls' s liberal 
conception of justice. Before turning to the task of explicating Rawls's conception of the 
self, however, several issues ought to be addressed for the purpose of clarifying the 
forthcoming exegesis. 
The first issue of concern pertains to Rawls's presentation of the self in both 
Theory and Political Liberalism. As students of liberal theory will have noted from the 
outset, Rawls has emphatically disavowed any endorsement of a substantive account of 
human beings in his conception of justice. His stated rejection of a comprehensive or 
metaphysical portrayal of persons, unfortunately, makes an investigation of Rawls's 
conception of the self a great deal more complicated.53 
53
Here it is important to clarify the use of the terms "metaphysical" and "comprehensive." Rawls 
was initially concerned with not advancing any substantial metaphysical claims about persons in JAF. 
Later, when Rawls began to develop his political conception of justice, and therein his political notion of 
persons, he was not concerned with metaphysical claims, but rather with comprehensive claims about 
persons. By the term "comprehensive" (as in a comprehensive doctrine about persons), In Political 
Liberalism (59), Rawls states that: (1) it "covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of 
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner"; (2) "[i]t organizes and characterizes 
recognized values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the 
world"; and (3) "it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine". According to 
Mulhall and Swift (177), the motive behind Rawls's switch "is that it is possible that even if the conception 
of the person involved were not merely that of the person as citizen but did indeed involve a comprehensive 
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Human beings are depicted by Rawls as rather elusive and shadowy figures in the 
pages of both Theory and Political Liberalism.54 Indeed at no point does Rawls 
enumerate a comprehensive list of the essential qualities for conceiving of persons as 
human beings. One is left to speculate whether Rawls has even offered a conception of 
persons, or an interpretation of human nature, in his conception of justice. What is of 
interest here is: (1) Why Rawls does not want to provide a substantive visions of persons, 
and (2) Whether Rawls does in fact ascribe any characteristics or attributes to persons that 
might in turn frame some rudimentary conception of persons. 
For the most part, the answer to the first question lies with Rawls's attempt to 
craft a liberal conception of justice capable of securing the fundamental rights of persons 
as moral beings, with their own conception of the good life, while remaining neutral 
between competing conceptions of the good. 55 In matters of persons pursuing their 
conception of the good, Raw ls believes that the state should remain neutral in providing a 
medium within which people can design, revise, and act upon their own vision of the 
moral, philosophical or religious doctrine, such as a fundamental commitment to autonomy in all areas of 
life, still this might not commit the advocate of the theory to any genuinely metaphysical claim, where the 
term 'metaphysical' refers to an ontological claim about the essence of human beings". 
54
In Political Liberalism, Rawls presents a more detailed (political) conception of persons, but 
only in the sense that they are to be considered citizens in a particular political culture. That is to say, the 
scope of Rawls's concept of persons is sharply restricted only to those exclusive political ideals, convictions 
and conceptions implicitly shared by citizens in the "public political culture" of a democratic polity. 
Beyond this political conception of persons as citizens, however, Rawls remains intentionally vague about 
the nature of persons. 
55Kymlicka, in Liberalism, Community and Culture (96-97), interprets Rawls's notion of neutrality 
to say "that governments cannot use as their justification for any action the fact that one person's way of life 
is more or less worthy than another's [since] government neutrality is part of what it is to treat people as 
equals." 
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good. Moreover, the state should not institute or enforce its own conception of the 
good.56 
Had Raw ls offered a "thick" or plenary conception of the good-either for 
persons or for persons via the community or the state, this would have resulted in two 
unsatisfactory outcomes.57 It would commit Rawls to a specifically metaphysical or 
comprehensive account of persons, which would ultimately prove unattractive and 
theoretically untenable. In addition, such a theory would fail to remain neutral in 
tolerating different conceptions of the good. It seems clear then why Rawls has not 
rendered a more elaborate version of a person's individual good-which would lead to a 
"thick" conception of persons-in his theory of justice. To do so would not only call into 
question the neutrality of, and therein the theoretical defensibility, of his liberal 
conception of justice, but would also fail to take seriously persons as moral beings worthy 
of respect. 58 
This brings us to the latter question: I will demonstrate in this chapter that on a 
close reading of Rawls's work one finds threaded throughout Theory a set of normative 
claims that taken together compose a distinctly liberal conception of persons. In Political 
56For an informative discussion on the liberal ideas of state neutrality and toleration of different 
conceptions of the good, see the influential work of Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1989), especially chap. 4. 
57The following points were similarly made by Thomas W. Pogge in Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 94-95. 
58For a general, yet informative, discussion on the idea of regarding persons as "moral" beings and 
the rational justification behind treating persons as creatures of respect, see S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, The 
Principles of Political Thought (New York: The Free Press, 1959), chap. 2. 
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Liberalism, Rawls takes a different tack in discussing personhood. Rawls formulates (or, 
rather, extracts) a set of normative claims based not on his own liberal conception of 
persons, but on an implicitly shared philosophical ideal among members of a democratic 
society. Persons inhabiting a specific political sphere, contends Rawls, view themselves 
as citizens with certain normative features in approaching matters of "political" justice.59 
Accordingly, Rawls is able to frame a set of normative conceptions on a distinctly 
political conception of persons qua citizens, not on a metaphysical or comprehensive 
conception of persons.60 
The second issue of concern is in reference to the semantic, and therein the 
conceptual, problems that plague countless interpretations of Rawls's conception of 
persons. Failure to recognize the subtle distinctions between "persons," "parties," and 
"citizens," argues Rawls, has led many to misread his theoretical position on human 
beings. For purposes of clarification in the forthcoming analysis, Rawls interprets each of 
these concepts to embody a particular view in his conception of justice. 
The notion of the person, explains Rawls, is used solely to capture the view "of 
you and me"-it is the view "from which justice as fairness, and indeed any other 
59 
Note that I am using the term "political" justice, and not "social" justice here. In Political 
Liberalism (38), Rawls writes, that "the conception of justice affirmed in a well-ordered democratic society 
must be a conception limited to ... 'the domain of the political' and its values." Thus, Rawls's political 
liberalism should be regarded as solely a conception of political justice and not a conception of social 
justice which was the focus of JAF. 
6
°Following Mulhall and Swift (passim), I will employ the terms "person qua citizen" to denote 
Rawls's political conception of persons. In addition, when explicating Rawls's conception of persons as 
explicated in Political Liberalism, the terms "citizen," "person qua citizen" and "political conception of 
persons" will all be used interchangeably. 
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political conception, is to be assessed."61 The term "citizen" (employed in Political 
Liberalism) represents a specifically political conception of persons. As Rawls points 
out, the idea of the citizen is a normative (or more specifically a moral) conception, which 
begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought, 
deliberation, and responsibility, and adapted to a political conception of justice 
and not to a comprehensive doctrine. It is in effect a political conception of the 
person, and given the aims of justice as fairness, a conception suitable for the 
basis of democratic citizenship.62 
The view captured here is the way "you and I" think and understand ourselves as citizens 
in the political sphere-not the private realm-as members of a constitutional democracy. 
Lastly, the term "parties" is used in reference to a particular hypothetical construct 
(i.e., the original position) that Rawls has modeled in his conception of justice. The 
original position, purports Rawls, "is set up by you and me in working out justice as 
fairness, and so the nature of the parties is up to us: they are merely the artificial 
creatures inhabiting our device of representation."63 The parties are to be considered 
either the representatives of persons (as outlined in Theory) or of citizens (as defined in 
Political Liberalism) in the original position, not in our veridical existence. Thus, the 
view captured here is how "you and I" want to be represented in the original position for 
the purpose of determining the fair and just way of distributing rights and duties. 64 
61 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 28. 
62Ibid., 18-19. 
63Jbid., 28. 
64Jbid., 3. 
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Having commented on the three ways persons are conceived in Rawls's project-
that is, as persons, as person qua citizens, as persons or citizens qua parties in the original 
position-attention may now be devoted to the fundamental problem of interpretation. 
For many critics of Theory, the original position seems to circumscribe a definitive set of 
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of persons based on the characterization of the 
parties in this hypothetical contract.65 Rawls warns, however, that such a reading is 
erroneous: "[T]he idea of the original position and the description of the parties may 
tempt us to think that a metaphysical doctrine of the persons is presupposed ... [However,] 
this interpretation is mistaken."66 
This points us to the crux of the problem when reviewing Rawls's conception of 
the person. We must determine: (1) whether we should count attributes given to the 
parties in the original position as characteristics of actual persons, contra Rawls's claims; 
and (2) we must decide if there are any significant features that Rawls has accorded to 
actual human beings outside of this original position. 
65This problem of interpretation-that is, of ascribing characteristics of the parties to actual 
persons-seems to be more symptomatic of the presentation of these concepts in Theory than in Political 
Liberalism. In the later work, Rawls is much more careful in delineating and draw out the distinctions 
between the concepts. As noted, Rawls attempts to distinguish "parties" in the original position from actual 
persons. While at some points in the text this distinction between actual persons and parties (representing 
persons) in the original position is lucid in Theory, at other moments it seems less obvious. This lack of 
clarity on Rawls's part, I think, has in turn led many critics to wrongly assume that attributes given to the 
parties are those given to human beings generally. Whether fault lies with Rawls convoluted account of 
these two notions, or with critics "error" in misinterpreting these conceptions, is purely a speculative 
matter. However, I am inclined to think that culpability resides with both parties in the debate. 
66Rawls, Political Liberalism, 29. 
Following Allen Buchanan, I am inclined to think that it is prima facie "wrong to 
extract Rawls' statements about the parties and read them as if they were his 
generalizations about human beings."67 However, we are similarly mistaken if we 
presuppose that Rawls's conception of justice does not rest on some conception of 
persons. The argument Mulhall and Swift adeptly make is that since Rawls's theory 
explicitly embodies the claim that, when it comes to matters of justice, people 
should be regarded as distinct from their particular natural endowments, social 
positions and ends, but possessed of a highest-order interest in their capacity to 
frame, revise and rationally pursue their conceptions of the good-such a claim 
amounts to an assessment of what is important about people, [and] what 
constitutes their well-being.68 
One finds underlying Rawls's conception of justice, then, a thin outline of a conception 
of persons. 
The third and final concern is Rawls's twin conceptions of the self: one as the 
conception of persons in Theory, the other the political conception of persons as citizens 
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in Political Liberalism. Rawls's treatment of persons in Theory is presented in a manner 
that is somewhat different from the conception delineated in his more recent publication, 
Political Liberalism. 
Since Rawls's conception of persons is embedded within the broader context of 
his work, we must look at the trends within these writings to render intelligible why this 
has culminated in two different, yet related, approaches to the self. Consonant with the 
67 
Allen Buchanan, Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism (Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1982), 135. 
68
Mulhall and Swift, 206-207. 
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opinions of other liberal theorists, Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit have detected two 
philosophical trends within Rawls's writings since the publication of Theory. In the first 
"movement," from 1971-1982, "Rawls offers a series of replies to objections, along with 
some changes to and elaboration's of his theory of justice, which go to provide a deeper 
understanding of the Kantian nature of his moral philosophy. "69 In the second 
"movement," from roughly 1982 to 1989, "Rawls forswears Kantianism and recasts his 
philosophical enterprise as a political rather than a moral endeavor."70 
Recently, however, Rawls has labored to reconcile these two contrasting 
philosophical movements under one coherent theory in Political Liberalism.71 I will 
assume, then, that this latest work by Rawls is the definitive statement of his newly 
fashioned political conception of justice, political liberalism. More importantly, this 
structural development in Rawls' s venture has yielded two different approaches to the 
conception of justice by Rawls, which in turn has effected how the conception of the self 
has been articulated in Theory and Political Liberalism. Recognizing this requires us to 
treat these two conceptions separately in the exposition. 
69
Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and Its Critics (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 120. This first temporal period includes the following works by Rawls: 
(1) "Concepts of Distributional Equity. Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion" (1974); (2) "The 
Independence of Moral Theory" (1974-75); (3) "Fairness to Goodness" (1975); (4) "The Basic Structure as 
Subject" (1978); (5) "A Well-Ordered Society" (1979); (6) "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory" 
(1980); and (7) "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" (1982). 
70Ibid. This second temporal period includes the following works by Rawls: (I) "Social Unity 
and Primary Goods" (1982); (2) "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" (1985); (3) "The Idea of 
an Overlapping Consensus" (1987); (4) "The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good" (1988); and (5) "The 
Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus" ( 1989). 
71 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xiv. 
34 
With these preliminary remarks, we now may turn to the general outline of the 
chapter. Having divided the chapter into two sections, the first part will present a brief 
and general introduction to JAF as delineated in Theory. The purpose of this sketch is to 
provide the necessary background in which to situate the discussion of Rawls's 
conception of the self. With this orientation, I will tum to an exegesis of the Rawlsian 
self by drawing out several themes and normative claims that underlie this conception. 
The second section of the exposition will be devoted to Rawls's conception of persons as 
delineated in Political Liberalism. In summation, the major theoretical contrasts between 
the notion of the self developed in Theory and in Political Liberalism will be highlighted. 
The Conception of Persons in A Theory of Justice 
In Theory, the underlying purpose, for Rawls, was to articulate a set of moral 
principles; that taken together would frame a conception of justice by which the 
fundamental institutions of society could be regulated in a fair and just manner.72 The 
foremost question for us, then, is by what method are these principles of justice to be 
chosen, and in what sense are these principles to be considered fair or just? To answer 
these questions, we must briefly unpack the two main concepts that lie not only at the 
heart of JAF, but also his conception of persons: the "original position" and the "veil of 
ignorance." 
72 Rawls, Theory, 11. 
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The original position is designed by Rawls as a hypothetical social contract-an 
abstract and procedural model that frames an initial situation through which "parties" can 
determine principles of justice. 73 When contemplating matters of social justice, we are to 
envision what parties in the original position would agree to for the purpose of regulating 
the "basic institutions" of society. In this way the original position provides both a 
method for determining principles of justice and "an independent justificatory source."74 
The principles of justice-agreed to by parties in the original position-will be 
just because the procedure itself is fair. 75 In other words, since the procedure is fair, the 
principles agreed to by the parties will in tum be fair. This, Rawls notes, "explains the 
propriety of the name 'justice as fairness': it conveys the idea that the principles of 
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair."76 
The question that follows, then, is what moral basis does Rawls have in 
establishing the fair conditions to be embodied in the original position? In reply, Rawls 
holds that the conditions fixed in the original position will presumably coalesce with our 
intuitive moral judgments as to what would be considered a fair and just situation (as 
73Rawls views social justice (i.e., the fair distribution of rights and duties to member's in society), 
as the proper subject of "pure procedural justice." In Theory (85), Rawls claims that social justice, as a 
pure procedural justice, establishes (1) "an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a criterion 
defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed." And, thus, made it "possible to 
devise a procedure that is sure to give the desired outcome." 
74
Tom Campbell, Justice (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 
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Rawls, Theory, 136. 
76Ibid., 20. 
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yielded in "reflective equilibrium").77 We would set certain limiting conditions on the 
original position in order for the procedure to be considered fair. 
This brings us to the second idea in JAF-the notion that parties in the original 
position are to be situated behind a "veil of ignorance" for the purposes of rendering a fair 
position. As a limiting condition, parties in the original position will not have access to 
certain knowledge. Rawls outlines, 
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; 
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural asserts and abilities, his 
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his 
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the 
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to 
optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the 
particular circumstances of their own society .78 
The aim of excluding these factors is to ( 1) rule out those "contingencies" that are 
morally arbitrary with regard to choosing principles of justice; and (2) to nullify those 
aspects that would set parties against each other. Left intact, these contingencies would 
surely render any agreement in the original position unfair and thus unjust. 
Beyond the above facts, however, Rawls does include the more general facts 
about society and social life to parties in the original position. It is assumed that parties 
77Ibid., 120. For Rawls. the way to match our considered moral judgments, with that which we 
consider to be fair conditions for determining fair principles of justice in the original position, is rendered 
through a process of "reflective equilibrium." This method, as relayed by Tom Campbell in Justice (73), 
"involves selecting our strongest and surest moral convictions as the provisional fixed point and then 
working backwards to the principles which would justify such intuition .. .In this way we move towards the 
elaboration of a set of consistent principles which, together with knowledge of social circumstances, lead us 
to make the judgments we do for the reasons we make them ... And, so, by a to-and-fro process of reflection 
in which judgments are developed and revised and principles tested and refined, we finish with an 
'equilibrium' of consistent judgments and principles." 
78 Rawls, Theory, 137. 
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will "understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the 
basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology."79 This general 
know ledge is allowed primarily in order to fit the principles of justice to the realities of 
life, and therein the conditions that make a conception of justice necessary. 
One more significant postulate is that parties in the original position would act in 
a rational manner when selecting principles of justice.80 With the above conditions taken 
together-the exclusion of individual particularities, the inclusion of "general 
information" of society, and the fact that parties are rational-Rawls believes he has 
modeled a foundational situation in the original position that proves capable of yielding a 
definitive conception of justice. 
The two principles of justice that would herein be agreed to by the parties in the 
original position are as follows. 81 The first principle-denoted The Greatest Equal 
Liberty Principle-to be chosen by the parties orders that: "Each person is to have an 
79
Ibid. 
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While I will elaborate on Rawls's notion of rationality as outlined in Theory later in the thesis, it 
seems appropriate here to make a few notes. In the conditions that frame the original position, Rawls 
assumes that parties will have the following information: (l) a conception of the good, (2) a sense of justice 
and (3) a ranking of the primary social goods of society. Based on this information, Rawls contends that 
parties will be able to "make a rational decisions in the ordinary sense." That is to say, "the original 
position has been defined so that it is a situation in which the maximin rule applies." The principle of 
maximin, writes Rawls. "tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the 
alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others." Thus given the 
information allowed into the original position, parties in the original position will conduct themselves in a 
rational manner according the principles of maximin in selecting the principles of justice. (Rawls, Theory, 
143, 155, 152-153). 
81
The first principle of liberty is to be held lexically prior to the second principle of distribution 
and opportunity. Thus, the concerns of the second principle should not at any time take precedence over the 
first principle. 
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all."82 
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The second principle-labeled The Difference Principle and The Fair Equality of 
Opportunity Principle-to be chosen by parties demands that: "Social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."83 
Though this account of Rawls's theory is selective and in no way an exhaustive 
account of JAF, it sufficiently conveys the gist of Rawls's project. The rest of this section 
is devoted to outlining those relevant themes that, in some sense, shape Rawls's 
conception of persons. In drawing out the principal components that frame the Rawlsian 
self, it should be noted that many of these concepts overlap extensively with other points 
being canvassed. Nevertheless, the following sections cover what I take to be the ideas 
significant in Rawls's conception of persons. 
Moral Individualism 
At the heart of Rawls's conception of persons, lies the commitment to a form of 
methodological individualism. Following Kant's moral theory, Rawls's underlying 
desideratum in JAF is to take seriously the idea of treating persons as creatures worthy of 
82 
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individual merit and respect in their own right. "To regard persons as ends in themselves 
in the basic design of society," writes Rawls, "is to agree to forgo those gains which do 
not contribute to their representative expectations."84 Society, to some degree, endures 
primarily for the welfare of individual persons; hence, the rights of individuals cannot be 
prima f acie trumped simply for the good of the state, the community, or others. 85 
This endorsement of individualism by Rawls is modeled into the conditions of the 
original position. Rawls holds that in this position parties representing persons will "have 
equal representation as moral persons who regard themselves as ends and the principles 
they accept will be rationally designed to protect the claims of their person."86 The 
relevant point here is that Rawls regards individual persons as the rudimentary 
determinant of analysis in choosing and adopting the principles of justice. 
From the outset, this raises the issue of what we mean by the tenn 
"individualism." We need a description of individualism that goes beyond the simple 
claim that individuals are considered to be the theoretical core of JAF. A distinction 
84Ibid., 180. 
85
For Rawls, to suggest that the good of society trumps the rights of individuals, would be to rely 
either on a perfectionist account of community or on an organic notion of society. Since both notions are 
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between a metaphysical account of individualism and a moral account of individualism 
would be beneficial. 87 
On the one hand, a metaphysical account of individualism, has already, in some 
sense, fixed the essential features of personhood and what the good of individuals entails. 
On the other hand, moral individualism, explains Kukathas and Pettit, is a theory of 
individualism that focuses only on how the institution of justice would be judged; that is, 
"a socio-political arrangement ought to be judged, and only judged, by how it affects 
individuals; it ought to be judged favorable for promoting the good of individuals [and] 
unfavorably for not doing so."88 Beyond this, moral individualism does not depend on or 
endorse a specific good for individuals or make statements about their metaphysical 
constitution. 
Para11eling the description of moral individualism, the scope of JAF focuses only 
on "socio-political arrangements" (i.e., "basic structure") of society.89 Rawls's rationale 
behind this focus is that he believes that this basic structure fundamentally affects a 
person's chances in life-"what they can expect to be and how well they can hope to 
do."90 Thus, a conception of justice must be judged on account of how justly or fairly the 
basic structure allocates primary rights and duties to individuals.91 
87For a further exegesis of the ideas of metaphysical individualism and moral individualism, see 
Kukathas and Pettit's excellent discussion in Rawls, 11-16. 
88Ibid., 12. 
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principal economic and social arrangements." 
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Following Kukathas and Pettit, Rawls's individualism is best characterized as that 
of a moral individualist, not a metaphysical individualist.92 Rawls' s conception of justice 
aims to treat persons (both men and women) as unique individual moral agents by taking 
"seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals."93 While Rawls is making a 
normative claim to the extent that in matter's of social justice individuals wish to be 
taken as the primary starting point (i.e., the rudimentary determinant of analysis), and the 
ultimate standard by which to assess a conception of justice, he is not necessarily positing 
a metaphysical account of individualism. 
Social Context and Individuals 
Rawls's individualism has raised a number of criticisms regarding the nature of 
the relationship between individuals and society. The communitarian camp has advanced 
the popular accusation that Rawls fails to recognize that persons are socially situated, 
embedded creatures that depend on their social environment for personal identity and 
conceptions of the good.94 
91
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Despite what communitarian objections may imply, Rawls does not deny the 
importance of social contexts and society in his conception of justice.95 Rawls has a 
cardinal interest in society (and therein the primary institutions of this system) since it 
forms the primary scope of his conception of justice. As understood in JAF, Rawls 
discusses social factors in four significant ways. 
In the first case, Rawls defines society as a cooperative enterprise between 
individuals. Persons in society cooperate in their relations with one another by 
acknowledging the fact that "certain rules of conduct [are] binding."96 Thus, persons act 
cooperatively when they show a willingness to act according to these publicly recognized 
rules. While this explains how persons are supposed to act in a cooperative enterprise, it 
does not demonstrate why persons in society would want to cooperate. 
Accordingly, Rawls states that persons in society cooperate for their "mutual 
advantage" because the principles of justice frames a set of "rules [which] specify a 
system of cooperation [that is] designed to advance the good of those taking part in it."97 
Despite the myriad interests that drive persons apart in society, they nevertheless have a 
95
N ote that I use the term "social context" and "society" instead of community in discussing 
Rawls's conception of justice. In Political Liberalism (40), Rawls holds that the notion of community is "a 
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97Ibid. 
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common interest in a society peopled with cooperative individuals. The reason, asserts 
Rawls, is that "social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have 
if each were to live solely by his own efforts."98 Based on our mutual motivation for the 
increased benefits of social cooperation, it is in the interest of individuals to band 
together, according to the recognized rules and procedures of conduct, into a cooperative 
social organization. In this way, Rawls's portrait of society is best viewed here as a 
prudential or instrumental basis for society. 
In the second case, Rawls recognizes the way in which society, and therein the 
common social existence of its members, effects individuals when it comes to fashioning 
their wants, needs, and identity. Rawls explains: "The social system shapes the wants 
and aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons 
they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are."99 The existing social system and 
its basic institutions is able to reproduce and replicate itself because individuals have 
formed a particular need or desire for the goods produced or secured by these institutions. 
In the third case, Rawls presupposes that the character of human beings is inclined 
towards sociability. Rawls does not want to establish the basis of human sociability on 
the fact that we have the capacity-as persons sharing a common social life-for 
developing a common language and culture which allows us to express our wants, beliefs, 
desires, thoughts, and so on. This proves to be a weak and "trivial interpretation of 
98
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human sociability" according to Rawls. 100 Rather, Rawls grounds sociability on the 
"three psychological laws" that are requisite for developing a sense of justice. 101 Rawls 
states that having the "capacity for a sense of justice ... would appear to be a condition of 
human sociability." 102 Given that Rawls presupposes that persons have this moral power 
(as will be discussed in the forthcoming section), one can conversely assume that one 
aspect requisite for human sociability is attained. 
The other condition underlying Rawls's conception of human sociability is 
founded on peoples' natural desire to form, join, and partake in the activities of "social 
unions." That is. Rawls associates persons' propensity for sociability with their natural 
desire to form social unions with people having similar goals and ends in order to pursue 
their visions of the good jointly. As participants in a social union laboring towards a 
shared common end, we derive a sense of gratification and regalement that one could not 
achieve hermetically. Humans form social unions, explains Rawls, because "[ w ]e need 
one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the 
success and enjoyment of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own 
good." 103 Since pursuing our vision of the good life is intricately bound up with other 
IOOlbid., 522. 
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member's engaged in commensurate activities, it follows for Rawls then that individuals 
have a natural affinity for the "tie of community." 104 
Having introduced the notion of social union, carries us then to our fourth and 
final point: Rawls's maintains that society, and therein social life, should be regarded as 
good in themselves; or, rather, society should be viewed as a shared common good. 105 
(On this account, it seems as though Rawls is tempering his earlier instrumentalists 
account of society.) 106 Rawls envisages society as "a social union of social unions.'' 107 
Akin to participants in smaller social unions, members in the social union of a "well-
ordered society (corresponding to justice as fairness)" also have "shared final ends and 
they value their common institutions and activities as good in themselves." 108 It is in this 
"sentimental" sense society is recognized as a common good. 109 
I 04Ibid., 526. 
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Equality and Moral Personality 
For Rawls, the actual "state of nature" is a situation rife with inequalities of all 
persuasions. People do not associate with one other on a level basis due to nature's 
inequitable distribution of physical powers, mental capabilities, natural talents, resources, 
and so on among persons. 110 Given that this inequitable distribution is vagarious and 
arbitrary, in the sense that inequalities are allocated by sheer luck, it follows for Rawls 
that these personal attributes are to be considered "morally" arbitrary. Individuals ought 
to receive equal consideration in matters of social justice, irrespective of whether they 
have fared well or ill in nature's cosmic lottery. 
Two implicit assumptions are being made by Rawls here: ( 1) that persons ought 
to be regarded as morally equal in thinking about social justice; and (2) that persons ought 
not to benefit from undeserved attributes and talents gained through chance. Rawls 
contends that these assumptions, which are constituted in the depiction of the original 
position, for the most part, capture our intuitive or moral judgments. We would accede to 
supporting the condition of equality in the original position, because when thinking about 
social justice, we believe persons, as moral beings worthy of respect, ought to have equal 
consideration in detennining the principles of justice. 
109Following Michael SandeJ's interpretation in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (149), I 
believe this notion of society should be labeled "sentimental" in the sense that it is based on "the feelings 
and sentiments of those engaged in a co-operative scheme." 
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Rawls places the parties behind the veil of ignorance in the original position so 
that they will not be rewarded for morally arbitrary attributes. If parties are not 
"advantaged or disadvantaged by social and natural contingencies", then they can each 
deliberate from a position of equal liberty whereby parties can freely choose the 
principles of justice. 111 Thus, Rawls's motive in situating parties behind a veil of 
ignorance then is to exemplify equality between persons as moral beings. 
In conjunction with the intuitive argument, much of Rawls's attempt to provide a 
theoretical justification for this equality hinges on his account of "moral personality." 
Moral personality, claims Rawls, consists of two moral powers or "natural attributes" that 
human beings are assumed to possess, which in turn provides the "natural basis of 
equality." 112 First, Rawls states that we "are capable of having (and are assumed to have) 
a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life)." 113 Second, Rawls 
states that we "are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, at 
least to a certain minimum degree." 114 By having a "sense of justice," Rawls maintains 
that human beings are capable of adequately comprehending and acting in a manner 
consistent with the chosen principles of justice. 
111 Rawls, Theory, 19. 
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The idea that equality should be based on the possessorship of these natural 
attributes to a minimal degree (whether manifest or latent), leads to an immediate 
question. How will a standard by which "a minimum degree" of moral personality be 
fixed, without invoking a basis for equality that is exclusionary? According to Rawls, 
All we have to do is to select a range property (as I will say) and to give equal 
justice to those meeting its conditions ... [W]hether there is a suitable range 
property for singling out the respect in which human beings are to be counted 
equal is settled by the conception of justice. But the description of the parties in 
the original position identifies such a property, and the principles of justice assure 
us that any variations in ability within the range are to be regarded as any other 
natural asset. There is no obstacle to thinking that a natural capacity constitutes 
the basis of equality. 115 
Accordingly, an acceptable range parameter can be set so that it comprehensively 
encompasses all human beings and thus they can all be eligible for equal consideration. 
The minimal standard of moral personality thus provides the theoretical justification 
requisite for regarding persons, in matters of social justice, as individuals with "a distinct 
claim to equal consideration."116 
Above we find Rawls making several normative claims about the nature of human 
beings: ( l) persons are capable of having, and indeed are assumed to have, a conception 
of their good; (2) persons are both capable of, and do have, a sense of justice; (3) persons 
ought to be considered morally equal; (4) equal consideration of persons ought not be 
based on morally arbitrary characteristics. Unlike the first two descriptive based claims 
115Ibid., 508. 
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(i.e., as an attribute of persons per se), the latter two claims are normative in the sense 
that he is claiming how persons "ought to be treated alike." 117 
Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests 
As outline in the foregoing section, Rawls assumes that persons have "an identity 
of interests" which informs their conception of the good or "plan of life." 118 
Correspondingly, individuals will be inclined to pursue and affirm a wide range of 
diverse goals, lifestyles, projects, values, and so on. The relevant point here is that Rawls 
makes the normative assumption that persons have a conception of their good, and that by 
extension they have a stake in making claims on the basic structure of society for the 
purpose of facilitating their attainment of the good life. 
Rawls takes up this assumption in modeling the sort of claims to be advanced in 
the original position. Though parties are considered to be behind the veil of ignorance, 
they will be cognizant of the fact that they have a conception of the good which 
comprises their life plan, and that it will be in their interest to advance this conception. 
Given that this is the case, Rawls lists two additional attributes that parties in the original 
position will be ascribed. First, in pursing their conception of the good, selecting the 
range of primary goods, and in choosing the principles of justice, parties are to be 
117 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, The Principles of Political Thought, 124. 
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considered rational. Second, due to the factors requiring justice, Rawls states that parties 
must also be considered rationally disinterested. 
To elaborate on the first point: Rawls maintains that behind the veil of ignorance 
parties "know that they have some rational plan of life." 119 What does being rational 
entail for Rawls? The answer is that Rawls's notion of rationality is grounded in a type of 
rational choice theory, which is, in part, the kind of rationality on display in Kant's 
hypothetical imperative (that "directs us to take certain steps as effective means to 
achieve a specific end"). 120 Rational participants in the original position, posits Rawls, 
will: (I) establish "a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him"; (2) 
"[rank] these options according to how well they further his purposes"; and, (3) "follow 
the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater 
chance of being successfully executed." 121 
Because these tenets of rational choice at times fail to rationally order the long 
term plans of parties, Rawls introduces a supplemental conception of rationality-that is, 
"'deliberative rationality"-to augment the basic (short-term) conception of rational 
choice. By deliberative rationality, Rawls means that rational persons can work through, 
by way of self-reflection and self-critique, various options in order to determine which 
one is in the long run their best interest. It is assumed then by Rawls that a participant in 
119 
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the original position: ( 1) knows "the general features of his wants and ends both present 
and future"; (2) can approximate "the relative intensity of his desires, and to decide if 
necessary what he really wants"; (3) will "envisage the alternatives open to them and 
establish a coherent ordering of them"; and lastly, (4) after a plan is decided, participants 
are "able to adhere to it and ... resist present temptations and distraction that interfere with 
its execution." 122 Taken together, these cognate notions of rationality highlight Rawls's 
conception of parties as participants capable of rational decision-making in the original 
position. 
This brings us to the discussion of conflicting interests and therein the need for a 
condition of rational disinterest to be modeled in the original position. To begin, Rawls 
presumes that within society there inheres a set of descriptive or empirical conditions that 
together necessitate a conception of justice. Rawls has divided these "circumstances of 
justice" into "subjective" and "objective" factors. The objective determinants create "a 
condition of moderate scarcity" in society. 123 This condition generates conflicts among 
persons because, as Rawls explains, they "are not indifferent as to how the greater 
benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends 
they each prefer a larger to a lesser share." 124 
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The subjective factors relate to person's intellectual propensities for exacerbating 
conflict. Since it is a natural circumstance that there will be a melange of religious, 
philosophical, economic, political, and social doctrines affirmed by individuals, there will 
necessarily be discord between these individuals as each attempts to advance claims 
against the scarce resources in society. Sharpening this tension, human beings also 
"suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgment" merely because 
it is a "natural situation."125 
These circumstances of justice-the condition of moderate scarcity and the 
conflict between persons over visions of the good-have led Rawls's to hold that the 
proper motivation behind parties in the original position should be that of "mutual 
disinterest.'~ Parties will be neither envious, revengeful, or interested in assisting other 
participants conception of the good. The interests of parties in the original position, 
declares Rawls, "are in himself, not merely, as they must always be, interests of a self. 126 
At first glance, the tenant of mutual disinterest seems to be an odd way to 
conceive of parties in the original position as it implies that parties are egoistic-
interested only in themselves-and that they cannot be motivated "by benevolence, or an 
interest in one another's interests." 127 On this point, Rawls contends that mutual 
disinterest does not collapse into egoism, as "Schopenhauer thought of Kant's 
1251bid., 127. 
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doctrine." 128 Remember that the life plans of the parties are not interests "in a self'; they 
are interests "of a self that regards its conception of the good as worthy of recognition and 
that advances claims in its behalf as deserving satisfaction."129 As rightly understood by 
Buchanan, parties do not know "whether these conceptions [of the good] tum out to be 
egoistic, altruistic, or something in between [because it is] shielded from them by the veil 
of ignorance." 130 
Though parties are mutually disinterested in the original position, Rawls is not by 
extension claiming that actual persons are not motivated by the web of personal 
relationships (evoking strong and sincere emotions for others) that often comprise social 
life. 131 "'[O]nce the veil of ignorance is removed, the parties find that they have ties of 
sentiment and affection, and want to advance the interests of others and to see their ends 
attained." 132 It is only when thinking about matters of justice that parties, cloaked behind 
the veil of ignorance, that the bonds of personal ties become opaque. 
Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy 
Like the normative claim of equality, Rawls similarly affirms that we ought to 
consider persons morally free. This claim, however, immediately raises the question of 
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what Rawls intends by this concept of freedom. 133 First and foremost, Rawls assumes 
that persons are free in the sense that they have a free will; their fate is not predetermined 
by some cosmic order of things. Thus, persons have the capacity to make intentional 
choices in life and can in turn be held accountable for these choices. 
Second, Rawls notion of freedom is that of a political ideal. In the words of Isaiah 
Berlin, political freedom (in the negative sense of the word) is "the area within which a 
man can act unobstructed by others." 134 For Rawls, like Berlin, the notions of political 
liberty and freedom overlap in meaning. Rawls poses that "liberty can always be 
explained by a reference to three items: the agents who are free, the restriction or 
limitations which they are free from, and what it is that they are free to do or not to 
do." 135 It is these two accounts of freedom-as freedom of the will and as the political 
ideal of liberty-that are employed by Rawls in JAF. 
The original position is modeled by Rawls to frame a conception of justice that 
fits with the conception of persons as free agents (and will also yield a principle of 
freedom as a political idea in "justice as fairness"). 136 If we take parties in the original 
position as participants freely pursuing their conceptions of the good, whatever that might 
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be, it follows for Rawls that these individuals will necessarily consider liberty the primary 
social good requisite for executing their life plans. The "highest-order interest," for both 
the parties in the original position and persons in general, claims Rawls, is "in preserving 
one's freedom to revise one's ends, and hence in choosing institutions that will shape our 
ends."137 
This right to freedom, via principles of JAF, is correspondingly a right to 
autonomy, which Rawls considers important in parties choosing principles of justice and 
in persons exercising their agency. 138 The notion of autonomy employed by Rawls is 
applicable to two positions in JAF: the original position and actual society. In the first 
case, the conditions in the original position are set up so that parties, being free and equal, 
can act autonomously in choosing principles of justice. The second case applies to 
persons acting autonomously once principles of justice have been chosen. When actual 
persons conduct themselves in a manner consistent with principles delineated in JAF 
"they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best 
express their nature as free and equal rational beings." 139 In other words, they are able to 
act autonomously under this conception of justice. 
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The Conception of Persons in Political Liberalism 
Since the publication of Theory, Rawls has made several modifications to his 
original conception of justice, JAF. Broadly speaking, Rawls's revisions should be 
viewed as a shift in emphasis from what Rawls has called a "comprehensive 
philosophical doctrine" (as delineated in Theory) to that of a specifically political 
conception of justice (as laid out in Political Liberalism). 140 
The principal motivation inspiring Rawls to make this philosophical shift was for 
the purpose of remedying what he believed to be the theoretical flaws and inconsistencies 
plaguing JAF. 141 One should accordingly regard this latest statement of justice as fairness 
in Political Liberalism, then, as a revision and further evolution of Rawls's original 
conception of justice. Aside from the emendations made in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
maintains that "the structure and content of Theory [are] to remain substantially the 
same."142 
The question of interest then is what are the key points in which justice as fairness 
should now be regarded as strictly a political conception of justice? To answer, there are 
three fundamental ways in which justice as fairness should be considered a political 
conception. In the first case, the application of political liberalism, as a conception of 
140
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justice, is to be narrower in scope than in JAF: that is, it applies only to "the domain of 
the political."143 
Here two points should be made plain. First, Rawls only intends the principles of 
justice to apply to "political" (including the primary public, social and economic) 
institutions. Private (social) institutions in society-such as families, companies, clubs, 
associations, communities, and the like-are not the proper subject of political 
liberalism. 144 Rawls holds that these institutions fall beyond the purview of political 
justice. 145 The second point is that the political institutions Rawls is referencing are only 
those of a constitutional democracy, and not just any ideological regime. 
The second respect in which justice as fairness should be considered political is 
that it should be understood as a "freestanding" political conception of justice: it is not 
"presented as" or "derived from" any one comprehensive moral doctrine, rather it stands 
independent of such doctrines. 146 Rawls explains that citizens in a democratic society, 
through an "overlapping consensus" of comprehensive doctrines, can construct a 
mutually agreeable conception of political justice. 147 This overlapping consensus, 
143Ibid., 38. 
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summarizes Rawls, "develops the principles of justice from public and shared ideas of 
society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as free and equal by using the 
principles of their common practical reason." 148 
58 
The last way in which justice as fairness is to be considered a political conception 
is that its content is formulated in terms derived from the fundamental political ideas 
implicit in the "background culture" of a democratic society (which is constituted by a 
plethora of various conceptions of the good, comprehensive moral doctrines, ethos of 
private institutions, and so on). 149 Drawing on those intuitive notions and ideas 
embedded in the fabric of our social life-those historical traditions and shared social 
conceptions implicit in our view of the basic structures of society-justice as fairness 
aims to systematically articulate a coherent matrix of shared political values for the 
purpose of framing a conception of justice. 
Having made these brief points concerning political liberalism, I will now discuss 
Rawls' s political conception of persons. It is important to remember the differences 
sketched earlier between human beings, citizens (in a specific political society), and 
parties (acting as representatives of citizens in the original position). Rawls pays little 
attention to the notion of human beings and their nature in political liberalism, except to 
suggest that those attributes of human nature that we deem significant are contingent 
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upon on our point of view .150 Thus, Rawls is concerned only with one aspect of 
personhood given the aim of justice as fairness: persons qua citizens within a 
constitutional democracy. The scope of this conception, Mulhall and Swift explain, 
"applies only to the person insofar as she is an inhabitant of the public political realm and 
not to any other aspect of her life." 151 Rawls intends only to speak about persons-that 
is, as citizens-in this very limited sense. 
Moral Individualism 
As in JAF, Rawls continues to emphasize the primacy of the individual in matters 
of justice. This is demonstrated by his continued use of individuals (whether it be as 
actual persons, as persons qua citizens, or as parties in the original position ) as the 
primary unit of analysis and the standard by which to judge the "justness" of a theory of 
justice. 
In Political Liberalism, however, it seems Rawls has tempered-or perhaps 
further clarified-his earlier position on moral individualism. 152 ·This modification (or 
attempt to qualify his moral individualism) has been made in three ways. 
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First, by contending that rights do not only apply to individuals, but to (private) 
groups as well, Rawls seems to have widen his initial focus. On this matter, Rawls states 
that "[i]t is incorrect to say that liberalism focuses solely on the rights of individuals; 
rather, the rights it recognizes are to protect associations, smaller groups, and individuals, 
all from one another in an appropriate balance specified by its guiding principles of 
justice."153 One can infer then that Rawls is implying that associations and groups also 
. become standards, like individual citizens, by which to judge the fairness of theories of 
justice. In addition, by acknowledging the rights of groups, Rawls is in tum recognizing 
the importance of community and associations for individuals in society. 
Second, Rawls claims that the moral individualism underlying justice as fairness 
is based on our shared political conception of persons: that is, our conception of persons 
qua citizens is an idea implicit in our shared public political culture. As inhabitants of a 
constitutional democracy, Rawls contends, our political conception of persons is "one 
that begins from our everyday conception of persons as the basic units of thought, 
deliberation, and responsibility." 154 In this sense, individualism-that is, the idea that as 
citizens we should be treated as distinct and individual beings-is to be regarded as a 
publicly shared political value that all members of the society hold when it comes to 
thinking about ourselves as citizens. 
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Third, because "justice as fairness itself is a political conception of justice," Rawls 
posits that it escapes "a strong individualistic bias."155 The individualism underlying 
justice as fairness is not based on any brand of metaphysical or comprehensive moral 
doctrine; rather, it is a feature latent within our own political and social culture. 156 The 
normative claim that we ought to treat citizens as distinct individuals in matters of justice, 
is an ideal derived from our shared social life which all citizens within a democratic 
society can agree upon. Not only does this notion of individualism indubitably place the 
importance of social context at the center of this conception of justice, it renders moot 
some of the criticisms that alleged justice as fairness was based on a form of metaphysical 
individualism. 
Though Rawls has recast the theoretical underpinnings of individualism from the 
sort of normative claim implicitly made in JAF, his commitment to the idea of 
individualism (as a normative claim) in political liberalism remains intact. 
Individuals and Social Context 
One of the chief aims of Raw ls' s political conception of justice was to situate 
justice as fairness within a particular social and political context. By doing so, Rawls 
accounts for the way in which our formal conception of justice depends upon and is 
framed by our implicitly shared political values constituted by our shared social life. We 
155Ibid., 196. 
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conception of persons qua citizens, it is not however part of any specific comprehensive moral doctrine 
about the nature of human beings. 
must consider, then, "the principles of justice as designed to form the social world in 
which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our 
comprehensive ties and their conception of the good, are first acquired, and in which our 
moral powers must be realized, if theory are to be realized at all." 157 
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Justice as fairness is not to be viewed as a "foreign" conception to be mapped on 
to just any political society; it is a conception constituted by the implicitly shared notions 
of citizens embedded within a constitutional democracy. On this account, society for 
these citizens is viewed not only as "fair system of cooperation over time", but also as the 
"fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness, within which the other basic ideas are 
systematically connected." 158 
In order for society to be considered a fair system of cooperation, Rawls outlines 
three requisite conditions that must be in place. The political system is fair if the publicly 
acknow I edged principles of justice are those that citizens follow and form their actions to 
be consistent with the conception of justice that citizens agreed were fair. 159 Fair social 
cooperation involves reciprocity, which "lies between the idea of impartiality, which is 
altruistic (as moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as 
everyone's being advantaged with respect to one's present or expected situation as things 
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One final ingredient remains in order to make the idea of social cooperation both a 
necessary and plausible conception: individuals and groups must have a sense of their 
conception of the good. This "specifies what those who are engaged in cooperation ... are 
trying to achieve, when the scheme is viewed from their own standpoint." 161 If citizen's 
did not have a conception of their good-that is, if they did not want to make claims 
against society in pursuing their vision of the good life, then, there would be no need for a 
fair system of cooperation. 
Rawls claims that society as a fair system of cooperation is a good in itself based 
on a shared common end. In "supporting just institutions and of giving one another 
justice accordingly, not to mention many other ends they must also share and realize 
through their political arrangements," citizens are provided with a shared common end. 162 
In short, "the good realized is social: it is realized through citizens' joint activity in 
mutual dependence on the appropriate actions being taken by others." 163 
A well-ordered society is not only presented as a good for citizens as a group, 
observes Rawls, it is also good for individual citizens for two specific reasons. Society is 
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good for citizens in that it allows them the requisite freedom to utilize their moral powers, 
and this venture is deemed in itself a good thing. Another reason is that by fairly 
allocating the primary political goods necessary for exercising their moral powers, this 
has given citizens a private base for self-respect. 164 The distribution of primary goods, 
based on the political conception that citizens are free and equal, amounts to an 
acknowledgment in a public forum that all citizens have an equal status, and must be 
treated accordingly. 
Equality and Moral Personality 
This discussion on equality in political liberalism is similar to that in JAF, 
however, two substantial differences should be noted. The first dissimilarity is that 
Rawls is referring to citizen's as being morally equal, not a conception of persons as 
presented in J AF. In this respect, citizens are to be counted as morally equal by virtue of 
the fact that as members in a democratic society they regard themselves as equal when 
deliberating over issues of political justice. 
Akin to the description given to persons in JAF, Rawls also claims that citizens 
are to be regarded as equal because they possess certain moral powers which, taken 
together, constitute a citizen's moral personality. Citizens must have a sense of justice-
"the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice 
which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation"-and they must have a 
I 641bid., 203. 
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"determinate" conception of their good which they would rationally act upon in order to 
achieve their ends as d~fined by their good. 165 (As an addendum to JAF, Rawls assumes 
that citizens possess the above capacities throughout their lives.) 
This moral propensity, Rawls notes, should in no way be regarded as a physical or 
psychological attribute of human beings based on a form of biological determinism or 
universal interpretation of human nature. Rather it should be regarded as a philosophical 
conception constituted by "a scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain 
political conception of the person and an ideal of citizenship."166 
The primary differences in the conception of equality from JAF to political 
liberalism is that we should regard persons qua citizens as morally equal based upon our 
public political culture. And, that moral personality should be considered a philosophical 
concept, or a political ideal. 
Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests 
Rawls assumes that citizens in a democratic society have a conception of their 
own good. What is good is that which 
normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends 
we want to realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and 
loyalties to various groups and associations. These attachments and loyalties to 
various groups and associations who are the objects of these sentiments is also 
part of our conception of the good. We also connect with such a conception of a 
view of our relation to the world-religious, philosophical, and moral-by 
reference to which the value and significance of our ends and attachments are 
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understood. Finally, persons' conceptions of the good are not fixed but form and 
develop as they mature, and may change more or less radically over the course of 
life.167 
The significant difference between this account of the good and that given in J AF is that 
here Rawls draws more attention to the personal attachments of citizens to other 
individuals and to associations in the framing their conception of the good. 
As in JAF, Rawls presupposes that these citizens are rational in their pursuit of 
their life plan. However, in political liberalism, this notion of rationality is better 
articulated. Rawls introduces a distinction between citizens being "reasonable" and being 
"rational." 168 
Reasonableness is how citizens are expected to interact, according to their sense 
of justice, with other members in political society. It is evidenced by the 
acknowledgment of citizens to bear the burdens of responsibilities and "willingness to 
propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them provided others do." 169 
What is rational applies to (I) "a single, unified agent (either an individual or 
corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and 
interests peculiarly its own"; (2) the way "these ends and interests are adapted and 
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affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority"; and (3) "the choice of means, in 
which case it is built by such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means to 
ends, or to select the more probable alternative, other things equal." 170 
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Analogous to JAF, Rawls assumes that citizens in a democratic society will have a 
maelstrom of conflicting interests. Rawls moves beyond the discussion in JAF, however, 
in affirming that at the heart of political liberalism lies the presupposition that pluralism 
is an endemic and "permanent feature of the public culture of democracy." 171 It is a 
enduring feature given "the political and social conditions secured by the basic rights and 
liberties of free institutions," explains Rawls. 172 With reasonable pluralism-that is, 
there exists an irreducible plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good-and conflict 
as endemic features of democratic society, the political stage, and therein the task, for 
political liberalism is set: justice as fairness is given the monumental task of achieving 
reasonable "unity and stability" within a political society, whose inclinations are always 
teetering towards the brink of anarchical dissent. 173 
In conclusion, the notion of the good, rationality, and conflict have all received a 
recasting in political liberalism. Rawls has expanded the notion of the good to 
encompass the meaningful personal and communal attachments that seemed to be 
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marginalized in JAF's account of a person's good. With respect to rationality, Rawls 
made the necessary theoretical distinctions that seemed only implicit in JAF. Lastly, the 
idea of conflict in society, or pluralism of interests, based on long-standing operation of a 
democratic regime was the most marked divergence from JAF. 
Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy 
Rawls states that citizens should be considered morally free by virtue of the fact 
that they view themselves as such. Citizen's should be regarded as free in three respects. 
First, they are capable of exercising their will in freely choosing their life plans. Second, 
citizens consider themselves free in the sense that they are "self-authenticating sources of 
valid claims."174 That is to say, citizens "regard themselves as being entitled to make 
claims on their institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good (provided these 
conceptions fall within the range permitted by the public conception of justice)." 175 
Lastly, citizens are seen as free because "they are viewed as capable of taking 
responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed." 176 
Because citizens are free in these ways, they are also considered both "rationally" 
and "fully" autonomous. Citizens are rationally autonomous because they have the 
capacity to create, revise, and act upon the their conceptions of the good. Rawls models 
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this conception in the original position so that parties, as citizen representatives, will act 
autonomously when deliberating over the principles of justice. 
Just as citizens are rationally autonomous in two ways-they are free within the 
limits of political justice to pursue their permissible conceptions of the good; and 
they are motivated to secure their higher-order interest associated with their moral 
power-so the parties are rationally autonomous in two ways: they are free within 
the constraints of the original position to agree to whatever principles of justice 
they think most to the advantage of those they represent; and in estimating this 
advantage they consider those persons' higher-order interests. 177 
Full autonomy, in contrast to rational autonomy, cannot be modeled in the original 
position. "[F]ull autonomy is [only] realized by citizens," claims Rawls, "when they act 
from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to 
themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons." 178 Thus citizens exercise 
full autonomy by acting according to principles of justice as fairness in their pursuit of the 
good life. 
Contrasted with JAF, Rawls has posited that citizen's are morally free based on 
their own perception of themselves as citizens. As revealed by the public political culture 
of a democratic society, political liberty is esteemed as the primary social good given 
citizen's conception of themselves as free beings. While the concept of autonomy was 
analogous to the idea delineated in JAF, Rawls provided a more lucid treatment of the 
idea in political liberalism. 
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Conclusion 
Recall from chapter one the discussion from liberal political theory. In reviewing 
Rawls conception of persons in Theory and in Political Liberalism, it seems as though we 
find a similar set of normative assumptions outlined by Rawls. In Theory, he assumes 
that persons ought to be treated as morally equal and free individuals who have the 
capacity for a conception of the good with a complementary desire for the requisite liberty 
to pursue their life plans. While these conceptions outline a more individualistic account 
of persons, let us not forget Rawls's normative assumption in JAF that persons are indeed 
social creatures. Having outlined the normative features of the Rawlsian self modeled in 
the original position, it has been demonstrated that JAF is framed around a distinctly 
liberal conception of persons. 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls posits a similar set of assumptions about persons 
(with some minor exceptions); however, he has substantially altered the source and 
characterization of the former claims delineated in Theory. These normative assumptions 
are derived from implicitly shared political values generated by our public political 
culture and should be observed as a philosophical ideal concerning how persons regard 
themselves as citizens. Rawls's political liberalism in turn endorses a liberal conception 
of persons only to the extent that as citizens in a democratic society we publicly support 
the liberal "ideal of democratic citizenship."179 
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This move by Rawls from defending a conception of persons to a political 
conception of persons qua citizens has been significant for one cardinal reason. Since 
Rawls has mapped all of the normative assumptions sketched in Theory on to a political 
conception of persons as citizens, he avoids one of the primary shortcomings-namely, of 
invoking a metaphysical or comprehensive account of persons-of JAF. Thus, Rawls's 
political conception of justice as fairness, by and large, leaves the notion of actual person 
free from theoretically damaging normative entanglements. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF RAWLS'S CONCEPTION OF THE SELF 
Given the matrix of substantive and normative claims Rawls has ascribed to 
persons in his theory of justice, feminists have concluded that the Rawlsian self is a 
gender-biased conception. The Rawlsian self, assert feminists, entails certain 
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological assumptions that when taken together 
reveal a figure which is distinctively '·male" or "masculine." 180 
The aim of this chapter is to sketch out some of the principal allegations which 
have led feminists to make the above conclusion. In rendering a general account of 
feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the self, this exegesis will necessarily be 
selective. I have favored only those feminist critiques that are most representative of this 
body of criticism. 181 In addition, the material is not drawn from a single group of 
feminists, but rather from a myriad of feminist theorists. 182 
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Before moving to the task of unpacking specific critiques of the Rawlsian self, the 
provision of a framework for purposes of illuminating both the nature and direction of 
feminists' allegations would be prudent. To begin, regardless of whether contentions 
were formulated by cultural, relational, or postmodern feminists, for the most part, one 
finds three broad types of arguments launched against the Rawlsian self. 
The first argument feminists' advance alleges that Rawls's conception of the self 
is a metaphysical construct, with metaphysical attributes that are distinctly male or 
masculine in orientation. The second argument is that Rawls's conception of the self 
exists ontologically prior to its ends and social context. For feminists, this notion of the 
"separate" self is more consistent with male or masculine conceptions of the self than 
with female or feminine "relational" selves. The third argument is directed at Rawls's 
epistemology. Here feminists claim that Rawls employs a distinctively male or masculine 
conception of rationality. While each of the aforementioned arguments target a different 
perceived weakness of the Rawlsian self, they are all inspired by a shared belief: certain 
features of the Rawlsian self can be identified as embodying male or masculine attributes. 
This belief raises two important questions. First, what basis do feminists have for 
fashioning such a claim? Second, what characteristics do feminists consider distinctly 
female or feminine as opposed to characteristics that are male or masculine? In reference 
to the first question, the chief route feminists have taken in substantiating their claims has 
fit neatly together into a coherent and comprehensive critique. Different feminists have to some degree 
focused their critiques on different aspects of Rawls's conception of the self. 
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come in the form of a descriptive-type argument. By this I mean that feminists have 
generated two catalogs of gender attributes, one that is male or masculine and a another 
that is female or feminine. Feminists have used this catalog of descriptions to judge 
whether Rawls's interpretation of the self is one that is embodied with male or masculine 
attributes. 
Regardless of whether feminists have employed a socio-historical or cultural 
account of gender-identity construction or a psychological or psychoanalytic account of 
gender-identity construction, both have come to the same conclusion: a woman's sense of 
self is relational. Women consider themselves connected to others by way of a web of 
intimate and personal attachments which are not only constitutive of women's' identity, 
but also influence the way in which women act and reason from a relational perspective. 
In contrast to this vision of the relational self, feminists have interpreted the 
Rawlsian self-an alleged concatenation of male or masculine attributes-as an 
exceedingly ''autonomous, independent, individualistic, and [impartially] rational" 
creature. 183 Moreover, feminists claim that Rawls's separate self is asocial, detached, and 
self-interested individual. 
In overviewing the nature of feminist allegations, the examination will now look 
specifically at feminists' critiques of Rawls' s conception of the self. In the interest of 
consistency and continuity with the design of the preceding chapter, I have roughly 
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organized feminists' arguments under the headings set forth in the last chapter: moral 
individualism, social context and individuals, and so on. 
Moral Individualism 
It was stated in chapter two that Rawls subscribes to a fonn of moral 
individualism, which is inextricably tied to the belief that individuals ought to be treated: 
( 1) as beings of incomparable worth; (2) as the primary locus of analysis; and (3) as the 
ultimate standard by which to judge the fairness of his theory of justice. 
According to feminists (and other critics), this first-order moral assertion 
necessarily invokes a metaphysical view of human beings. To explain, Rawls's "ethical 
view of the locus of human worth presupposes in tum a particular second-order theory of 
the self and its constitution ... ; it presupposes a foundational account of the person." 184 
Feminists have formulated their claim of metaphysics in one of two ways. 185 The 
first and most common argument feminists make to uphold their allegation of 
metaphysics is presented as a historical fact, one endemic to all liberal theories of justice. 
The argument ordinarily runs as follows: since liberal theorists have historically 
subscribed to a metaphysical conception of persons, and given the fact that Rawls's 
theory of justice is a liberal conception, by extension Rawls's conception of persons is 
presumed to be a metaphysical conception. 
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An instance of this brand of argument is found in Jaggar' s outline of liberal 
theory's conception of persons. Jaggar states that "Liberal theory is unified ... by certain 
assumptions about human nature that constitute the philosophical foundation of the 
theory." 186 From this broad assumption that all liberal theories-including Rawls's-
make especial assumptions about persons, Jaggar then enumerates a list of "metaphysical 
assumption[s]" that undergirds the liberal conception of human beings. 187 In doing so, 
Jaggar infers that Rawls, consonant with other liberal theorists, employs a metaphysical 
conception of persons. 
A second and more recent trend within feminist theory has been to make the 
charge of metaphysics by way of a communitarian-type argument. 188 (Regardless of 
whether feminists explicitly or implicitly rely upon communitarian arguments, feminists 
have nevertheless begun to employ an argument unmistakably communitarian in 
appearance. 189) 
To understand the direction this argument takes, recall two postulates in Rawls's 
theory of justice. The first is the assumption that parties in the original position are to be 
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consider a self "prior to the ends which are affirmed by it," 190 which is to say that the self 
should be considered a subject prior to the ends (or conception of the good) that it 
pursues. 191 The second is the way in which Rawls models the original position so that 
knowledge about one's particularities would be disallowed in this initial position. Taken 
together, these two postulates have led feminists to conclude that Rawls's description of 
parties implies a conception of the self that is: ( 1) ontologically prior to their ends and 
social context; and (2) possessing certain metaphysical qualities. 
Rawls's description of parties in the original position, according to feminists, 
relies on a "veiled" yet discernible metaphysical view of persons, which is "empty of all 
metaphysical content except abstract reason and will." 192 That is to say, it is a conception 
of the self which is barren save for two discernible metaphysical qualities: agency (i.e., 
the ability to act autonomously in choosing one's ends or conception of the good) and the 
capacity to reason based on abstract, universal principles of impartiality. 193 
These two metaphysical qualities ascribed to the Rawlsian self-in conjunction 
with the notion that the self exists ontologically prior to its ends-have led feminists to 
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claim that the Rawlsian selves exist "metaphysically prior to their individuating 
characteristics." 194 Rawls's assumption here, as critics like Jaggar point out, "is that the 
essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently 
of any particular social context."195 This is problematic, say feminists, for to regard 
selves as possessing qualities of rationality and agency prior to their individuating 
circumstances necessarily "slips into a metaphysics according to which it is meaningful to 
define a self independently of all the ends it may choose and all and any conception of the 
good it may hold."196 
For feminists, then, Rawls's moral individualism is not simply a first-order moral 
view, but one that necessarily entails-and relies upon-a metaphysics of personhood. In 
relation to individualism, feminists claim that Rawls subscribes to a particular form of 
metaphysical individualism, which necessarily evokes certain assumptions about the 
character of persons. As will be enumerated in the following section, feminists believe 
that Rawls's metaphysical individualism supports a notion of the self that is necessarily 
antithetical to society, social context, and personal attachments. 
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Individuals and Social Context 
As indicated, feminists contend that it follows from Rawls's description of parties 
in the original position to mean that "human individuals are ontologically prior to 
society ."197 By way of this argument, feminists have concluded that Rawls's conception 
of persons "begins from the premise of radical or abstract individualism."198 This 
premise, according to feminists, is indicative of the way in which Rawls perceives the self 
as (metaphysically) abstracted from social context. Rawlsian persons, as it were, "exist as 
actors logically, if not temporally, prior to the entry onto the social stage", which are 
endowed with metaphysical attributes prior to their casting in the human drama. 199 
In arguing that Rawls subscribe to a brand of abstract individualism, feminists 
have made the following assumptions about the Rawlsian self and its relationship to 
society and social context. First, feminist charge that Rawls portrays humans as atomistic 
units. Elizabeth Wolgast claims that Rawlsian selves represent creatures that are 
"complete in themselves, they are self-contained, independent, self-motivated, energized 
from within-by passions and desires, Hobbes would say."200 Invoking a similar 
197 
Jaggar, 28. 
198Hirschmann, Rethinking Obligation, 113. In tandem with Hirshmann's definition of abstract 
individualism, Friedman and Tong advance a similar definition. "Abstract individualism," explains 
Friedman in "Feminism and Modern Friendship" (304 ), "considers persons as social atoms, abstracted from 
their social contexts, and disregards the role of social relationships and human community in constituting 
the very identity and nature of human beings." In Feminist Thought (36), Tong claims that an "abstract 
individual is one whose emotions, beliefs, abilities, and interests can supposedly be articulated and 
understood without any reference whatsoever to social context." 
199 
Jaggar, 86. 
200Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Grammar of Justice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
11. 
80 
Hobbesian "man as mushroom" imagery, Benhabib asserts that Raw ls presumes "that 
people are by nature separate, self-contained, unrelated beings, somehow sprung into the 
world fully adult and independent,"201 as Diana from Zeus's head. 
Second, the Rawlsian self depicts human beings as asocial--or, to use Jaggar's 
term, "solipsistic"-selves. Portrayed as isolated and removed from social relations and 
communal attachments, feminists claim that Rawls's description of parties in the original 
position as both mutually disinterested and ontologically prior to their ends intimates a 
self that is alienated. 
As a result, feminists have interpreted the Rawlsian self as liable to be averse-if 
not diametrically opposed-to communal attachments. Hirschmann claims that Rawls 
"depends on a conception of the individual that is at odds with community ."202 Similarly, 
MacKinnon maintains that for liberals such as Rawls "what it is to be a person is to be a 
unique individual, which defines itself against, as distinct from, as not reducible to, a 
group."203 Feminists conclude that given Rawls's depiction of persons they are naturally 
predisposed towards antagonistic relationships with others, and with communal goals. 
Such persons are considered not only asocial but competitive (with inclinations of 
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violence and aggression), which burdens those around them with the fear of being 
"potentially threatened. "204 
Third, stemming largely from the assumption of mutual disinterest, feminists have 
understood the Rawlsian self to be egoistic in disposition. Moreover, as an abstract 
individual free from the entanglements of social context and the circumscription imposed 
by social life, the Rawlsian self is predisposed to be the perfect egoist. 
The Rawlsian self, Benhabib explains, "is a narcissist who sees the world in his 
own image; who has no awareness of the limits of his own desires and passions; and who 
cannot see himself through the eyes of another."205 Satisfied with only selfish desires and 
interests in securing its own welfare, the Rawlsian self appears to care not for others. It is 
highly unlikely then, say feminists, that women would "formulate a conception of 
[disinterested] rationality that stressed individual autonomy and contained such a strong 
element of egoism as the liberal conception."206 
Fourth, feminists claim that the Rawlsian self is a disembedded and disembodied 
subject. By holding that the self possesses an identity prior to having a particular 
conception of the good, Rawls implies that ends and conceptions of the good are not 
constitutive of a person's identity. As it were, he supposes that a person's identity-which 
enjoys ontological priority-can be extirpated from a person's conception of the good. 
204
Anne Phillips, "Introduction," in Feminism and Equality, ed. Anne Phillips (New York: New 
York University Press, 1987), 15. 
205
Benhabib, 84. 
206 Jaggar, 46. 
For feminists this implies two things. First, that "human beings are not 
necessarily constituted by society but instead are capable, in principle of withdrawing 
from society to redefine their own identity."207 Rawls's assumption here "is that the 
essential human characteristics are properties of individuals and are given independently 
of any particular social context."208 Second, a self's identity exists ontologically prior to 
those communal, cultural, familial relationships in which people generally find 
themselves embedded.209 
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Feminists claim that what Rawls fails "to recognize is that all rational human 
persons are always and already in human community."210 People are embedded within a 
particular social context that necessarily affects both their identity and their conception of 
the good: their identity is "socially constituted."211 To consider persons as existing 
beyond a particular social context is to not consider "human selves at all."212 
The fifth and final assumption, concerns Raw ls' s depiction of society-a 
depiction that has proven troublesome to feminists. If the Rawlsian self is indeed such an 
atomistic, asocial, violent being-whose interests surely do not lie towards a social 
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direction-then why would a society be formed at all? Why would it be rational for such 
beings, given their nature, to confederate into such a social organization? 
Feminists state that "the only satisfying explanation [Rawls] can offer for why and 
how individuals form community is the contractarian one" based on mutual self-interest 
(derived from rational choice).213 According to Benhabib and Cornell, "Whether it be 
welfare liberals like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, or libertarian, market liberals like 
Friedrich Hayek and Robert Nozick, both groups view society as a system of mutually 
advantageous arrangements."214 As an arrangement of mutual advantage, Rawlsian 
society is not the focus of communal goal or constitutive connections. Society is simply 
instrumental in promoting an individuals' self-interests; thus, "the selfish self [is] forced 
into community, on essentially empirical grounds," claims Rosemarie Tong.215 
Equality and Moral Personality 
Given feminists' central program-the achievement of equality between the 
sexes-one would assume that feminists would primafacie welcome Rawls's normative 
claim that persons ought to be treated with equal consideration. Though feminists 
support the notion of equality between the sexes in theory, the quandary for feminists, 
according to Sally Alexander, "may be summed up in the tension between the plea for 
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equality and the assertion of sexual difference. If the sexes are different, then how may 
that difference (and all that it implies for the relative needs and desires of women and 
men) be represented throughout culture, without the sex that is different becoming 
subordinated?"216 Feminists' contentions with liberal equality then hinge on whether 
Rawls's theory can account for the relevant differences between men and women's 
needs-as defined by feminists-when distributing political and social goods. 
On the whole, feminists have concluded that Rawls's notion of equality will 
generate sexual inequalities due to the fact Rawls' s conception of persons is grounded on 
a gender-neutral conception of persons (which feminists have interpreted to be a male or 
masculine). Selma Sevenhuijsen explains that for liberals such as Rawls "[t]he route to 
liberation [via normative equality] involves the breaking down of inequalities and 
differences. Justice can be perceived as consisting of a collective effort to dismantle all 
mechanisms that maintain the division of humanity into two sexes."217 Phrased 
differently, equality as a normative claim aims not to treat persons differently based on 
gender, but only to treat persons alike. 
According to feminists, the reason sexual inequalities exist in the "relations 
between the sexes" is because liberal theorists like Raw ls have failed to recognize that 
inequalities are "based on inherent differences" between the sexes.218 Because Rawls 
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does not account for these differences between the sexes in his (gender-neutral) treatment 
of persons, feminists claim that women will be discriminated against. Jaggar argues that 
"the liberal insistence on 'formal' equality, which comes from viewing people as abstract 
[and gender-neutral] individuals makes it easy not only to ignore the varying needs [and 
interests of women] but even to claim that satisfying the needs of a certain group would 
amount to 'reverse discrimination' or giving special privileges to women."219 Rawls's 
liberal equality, conclude feminists, refuses to treat women differently which "will 
undermine rather than promote the cause of equality (understood in more substantive 
terms) between men and women."220 
On another front, feminists argue that Rawls notion of equality is based on an 
objectionable ideal of moral personality: that is, that parties in the original position 
would have the capacity for a '"sense of justice" and a conception of their good. (I will 
discuss the feminist objections to the capacity for a sense of justice here, and explore 
feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the good under the next section.) 
Feminists argue that the notion of having a sense of justice is applicable only to a 
male or masculine gendered self, not to a female or feminine gendered self. As described 
by Carol Gilligan, men's moral "voice" is that of an "ethic of justice," much like Rawls's, 
whereas women's moral "voice" is of an "ethic of care." 
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Following the work of Gilligan and others, many feminists contend that men make 
moral judgments from a justice perspective as depicted in Rawls's theory, while women 
make moral judgments from an empathetic or relational perspective. Women and men 
describe the "moral domain" in different terms: women view moral dilemmas "as a 
problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than a one of rights and rules," 
whereas men view moral dilemmas as a problem of "equality and reciprocity ."221 Gilligan 
explains "the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, 
which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach."222 
The significance for feminists is that the "justice approach" articulated by Gilligan 
is associated with men's moral judgment or reasoning which is, by extension, linked to 
Rawls's theory of justice and therein his conception of the self. Rawls's derives moral 
principles based on an ethic of justice. Analogous to Gilligan's description of men's 
moral reasoning, the Rawlsian self claims rights and applies universal and impartial 
moral principles to determine what is to be considered fair and equitable in social 
relations. In contrast, women's moral reasoning accords with the "care approach," which 
is based on responsibilities (not rights) and on the concrete relationships and social 
context (not abstract or hypothetical situations as depicted in the original position). 
Feminists conclude that women's notions of the moral domain-and therein their 
moral judgments-are not applicable to Rawls's conception of persons possessed of a 
221
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sense of justice. By grounding moral equality on the capacity of having a sense of justice, 
feminists conclude, Rawls fails to acknowledge that women's moral reasoning differs 
from that of men. 
Conception of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests 
While feminists do not generally challenge the idea that persons have a 
conception of their good, they do object to the manner in which Rawls depicts this notion. 
Here feminists claim that Rawls's conception of the good fails on two accounts. First, as 
previously mentioned, Rawls does not account for the way in which a person's conception 
of the good and values are communally derived. Second, feminists object to Rawls's 
description of the parties as having a conception of their own good, yet being "mutually 
disinterested" in the conceptions of the good held by others. Feminists interpret Rawls as 
stating that "each human individual has desires, interests, etc., that in principle can be 
fulfilled quite separately from the desires and interests of other people."223 
A person's conception of the good life, say feminists, is inextricably bound up 
with and constituted by a web of personal attachments. Persons (particularly women who 
are considered other-oriented) take as their conception of the good the welfare and 
interests of others. However, such other-orientation is precluded, claim feminists because 
Rawls's conception of the good fails to admit of the plausibility that persons will take as 
their good the good of other persons. 
223 Jaggar, 30. 
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This brings us to feminist contentions with Rawls employment of rationality. 
Following from rational choice theory, Rawls postulates that parties would be rational in 
selecting principles of justice. The notion that it would be rational for parties to choose 
principles of justice according to the maximin principle, however, has been met with a 
barrage of critiques. Summarizing these critiques, Kymlicka relates: 
Many people have criticized Rawls claim that that 'maximin' is the rational 
strategy. Some claim that it is equally rational, if not more rational, to gamble on 
utilitarianism. Others claim that it is impossible to assess the rationality of 
gambling without knowing something about the odds, or about one's risk-
aversion. These critics allege that Rawls only comes up with the difference 
principle because he rigs the description of the veil of ignorance so as to yield it, 
or because he makes gratuitous psychological assumption which he is not entitled 
to make.224 
Feminist criticism of Rawls's use of rational choice, however, is of a different 
color. They are generally not concerned with whether Rawls's notion of rationality 
effectively yields the difference principle or if it is indeed rational.225 Feminists are 
concerned with whether Rawls's notion of rationality favors men on a broader scale. 
Many feminists claim that Rawls's methodology "of individualism and rational choice," 
necessarily, "betrays a masculinist [or male] bias."226 
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Recent feminist scholarship has devoted much attention to illustrating how 
historically the notion of rationality has epistemologically reflected the interests, views, 
and experiences of men. Throughout antiquity women have been associated with 
irrationality stemming from their link to the body via their reproductive capacities, while 
men have been associated with rationality originating from the mind. 227 
The result of women's association with irrationality has led to women's exclusion 
both from the sphere of rationality and the sphere of the political, because a person's 
capacity for reason has long been the standard by which to judge a person's ability to 
participate in the political domain.228 According to Susan Hekman, the idea that "women 
have been excluded from both politics and rationality since the inception of western 
thought has become a commonplace that is rarely challenged."229 
While the above reading of history by feminists is theoretically questionable (as it 
relies upon dubious contemporary psychological theories), we must ask why feminists 
believe this pertains to women in contemporary society? Since women appear.to have 
been fully incorporated into the political domain as citizens in society, why do feminists 
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still consider rationality a notion that works to exclude women from the political sphere? 
Are not women as rational as men? 
Feminists have answered this question in one of three ways. First, the "feminist 
rationalism" standpoint claims that women in the past were "unfairly excluded from the 
respect which they are due as human beings on the basis of an insidious assumption that 
they are less rational" than their male counterparts.230 Thus, men and women should be 
considered equally rational. Second, the ''feminist anti-rationalism" position claims that 
we should re-valorize what has been historically touted as feminine irrationality (i.e., 
partiality, empathy, etc.). Third, the "feminist postrationalist" position has been to reject 
the idea of rationalism altogether and call for a new discourse that would transcend the 
present dialogue of rationalism. They advocate that neither the traditional "male" nor 
"female" paths of rationality ought to be employed. 
Of these three positions, the second has been the common position taken in 
feminist evaluations of Rawls.231 Feminists argue that it is the male notion of rationality 
that is given priority in Rawls's theory of justice. What can be considered "male" 
rationality, as illustrated in Rawls's theory of justice, and "female" rationality? 
23°Christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda J. 
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To make this distinction between male and female rationality, feminists claim that 
men and women reason differently: women reason from a care-based perspective and 
men from a justice-based perspective. The connection between moral reasoning and 
rationality is that based on differences in moral reasoning, feminist argue that men and 
women have different interpretations of what is to be rational. 
Feminists believe that the Enlightenment conception of rationality employed by 
Rawls emphasizes the justice-based approach to moral reasoning that relies exclusively 
on abstract, universal, and impartial criteria for choosing principles of justice. This 
conception of rationality accords well with men's moral reasoning; however, "women, 
who view moral problems in contextual, relational terms, are defined as inferior moral 
beings, as deformed males."232 
Unlike women who reason morally from a contextualized position characterized 
by personal relationships, Rawls attempts to achieve impartial rationality through a 
hypothetical situation "by imagining that you and other rational, self-interested 
individuals have to make decisions about basic social principles in ignorance of your 
particular social position, special interests, sex, race, etc."233 
Contrasting impartial reasoning, feminists argue that women reason from a social 
position of empathy "for they enable one to understand people who are different from 
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oneself, and they are moral, for they prepare one to respond to people's needs."234 
Dissimilar to the generalizing involved in impartial reasoning that eliminates a sense of 
the other and the particularity of their situation, empathy yields relevant information 
about people and their unique needs. 235 It allows one the "capacity to put oneself in 
another's positions" and effectively understand the needs of the other.236 
In sum, feminists reject Rawls's notion of rational choice as part of a larger 
critique of Rawls's methodology: that is, Rawls's attempt to derive moral principles 
based on an abstract, hypothetical model. This methodology, feminists argue, parallels 
men's way of moral reasoning, not women's way of moral reasoning. As a result, the 
"liberal conception of reason and rationality have rendered women's point of view either 
'irrational or particularistic' or 'concretistic and trivial'," claim Seyla Benhabib and 
Drucilla Cornell. 237 
Lastly, we can turn to the issue of conflicting interests. Rawls's view that there 
naturally arises a conflict of interest between persons due to the circumstances of justice, 
feminists argue, presents an incorrect picture of society and personal relationships. That 
is, Rawls portrays society as riven with conflictual and competitive human relationships, 
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whereby "human beings are seen as tending naturally toward egoism or the maximization 
of their own individual utility."238 
This depiction of persons, claim feminists, contradicts women's moral relational 
disposition. For women, the self is "nurturant," "not competitive," "giving" and "caring" 
of others in society.239 Rawls's assumption of conflicting interests appears to be 
depicting the experiences and moral orientation of men in his description of persons, not 
women. 
Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy 
Rawls's interpretation of autonomy, according to feminists, miscasts the nature of 
human beings (particularly women) and human relationships as it evinces a notion of the 
self whose "only legitimate connection to others are those initiated by the individual or 
agreed by him of his own free choice."240 
Feminists instead want to focus on moral autonomy for relational selves, which 
must be viewed as "a morality of responsibility and care [that] begins with a self who is 
enmeshed in a network of relations to others, and whose moral deliberation aims to 
maintain these relations."241 Feminists have delineated two types of autonomy--one 
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pertaining to men's autonomy, and another to women's. Hirschmann explains, "the 
differences in masculine and feminine experience can be seen to tum on two different 
conceptions of autonomy, just as they turn on two different senses of self."242 
While most feminists view moral autonomy based on a conception of persons as 
"self-in-relation," and not Rawls' s "separate self," there is no consensus among feminists 
as to how one should approach the notion of moral autonomy. 243 Some feminists, 
building on Gilligan's research, believe that "autonomy represents a peculiarly masculine 
point of view," and thereby it should be abandoned for a notion of agency based on 
women's intrinsic connectedness to others.244 Because of autonomy's link with "'selfish' 
individualism", feminist writers "have long viewed the conception of autonomy as 
antithetical to feminists values [and their ethic of care]."245 
A majority of feminists, however, are not willing to dismiss the notion of 
autonomy and human agency all together for some vague notion of interconnectedness. 246 
In the wake of feminist theorists' "growing distrust of communitarian politics," and a 
mounting skepticism of relational feminism, Anne Dailey notes, that there has been "a 
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corresponding appreciation for individual autonomy."247 Feminists have increasingly 
questioned this juxtaposition of men's "autonomy" with women's "being in relation," 
which they see as dangerous theoretical move for women attempting to provide a theory 
of women's liberation. 
As a result, feminists have retained an appreciation for autonomy, however, they 
support a brand of autonomy built on a relational sense of self. In contrast to "reactive 
autonomy" (which feminists believe accurately reflects Rawls's style of moral reasoning), 
"relation autonomy" (which feminists believe capture a women's moral reasoning) has 
been the favored model of autonomy. Feminists argue that reactive autonomy 
inaccurately "confuses autonomy with separation and independence from others,"248 
while relational autonomy, on the other hand, "operates from a notion that the self is 
conceived in terms of, and draws strength from, relations with others."249 
Akin to the notion of autonomy, feminists do not reject the normative value of 
freedom and the concomitant desire for political liberty per se. Feminists, rather, take 
exception to Rawls's interpretation of freedom as a distinctly "negative freedom," which 
they again believe invokes an individualistic portrait of persons. According to feminists, 
freedom for Rawls seems to be a matter of one's overcoming the obstacles of personal 
attachment and the web of personal relations. Thus, Rawls must work "from an 
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assumption of separateness and freedom" in order "to understand how isolated 
individuals can develop and sustain connections and still be separate, how they can 
engage in relationships and still remain free."25° For Rawls, say feminists, freedom is a 
normative given: man is assumed to be born morally free. 
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Feminists, on the hand, argue that what is a normative given is not that we are 
born free (in the liberal sense of the word), rather we are born attached and connected to 
others at birth. Thus, the ideal of freedom is one where persons work from a position of 
interconnectedness and social context. Feminists, such as Hirschmann, advocate an ethic 
of care or "responsibility mode, beginning with connection, [that] tries to determine how 
to provide space for the self without violating the moral imperative of care. This 
perspective would indicate that although freedom is certainly achievable in the context of 
human relations, it must be achieved; it is not a given. Freedom is an entity that must be 
created, as an individual carves out space for herself."251 
In brief, feminists are not rejecting the value of freedom and autonomy. What 
they are rejecting is Raw ls' s interpretation of these concepts through a masculine lens of 
the separate self, which feminists believe presents an inherently flawed rendering of these 
conceptions. Conversely, feminists suggest that these concepts must be reinterpreted in 
the light of a relational conception of the self; thus, the desire for freedom and autonomy 
takes on a different complexion than that valued by the Rawlsian self. While the social 
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self indeed finds some value in the ability to act autonomously and free, it is always 
exercised within the limits of a particular social context and within certain communal and 
personal attachments that must be maintained and protected. 
Conclusion 
In examining feminist contentions with Rawls, we find them making a series of 
claims regarding the nature of the Rawlsian self and its relationship to society. Plainly 
feminists believe Rawls's conception of the self is metaphysically abstracted from social 
context. This is demonstrated by their claim that Rawls assumes: (1) persons exist 
ontologically prior to social context; (2) that the self is atomistic and asocial; (3) that the 
self's identity, ends and conception of the good are not socially constituted; rather, they 
are presocial conceptions that one voluntarily chooses, or self-wills; and ( 4) that the 
normative values of freedom and autonomy ascribed to persons are acontextual. 
Additionally, feminists have rejected Rawls's theory based on their description of 
women as relational selves in contrast to the above interpretation of the self. Feminists 
argue that Rawls's conception of justice does not differentiate persons based on sex-based 
differences; thus, women are discriminated against because Rawls theory of justice is 
incapable of detecting existing gender-biases in society and the "real" differences 
between men and women. Moreover, the Rawlsian self is understood by feminists to 
make moral decisions based on individualistic rationality which assumes persons make 
moral judgments based on impartial, universal principles, which is in opposition to the 
way they believe women make moral decisions. Taken together, the above factors have 
led feminists to conclude that Rawls's portrayal of persons is gender-biased. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATING FEMINISTS' CRITIQUES OF THE RA WLSIAN SELF 
Having outlined Rawls's conception of the self as found in Theory and Political 
Liberalism and reviewed feminists criticisms of this concept, at this juncture, the 
investigation will begin evaluating the aptness of feminist claims. In defense of Rawls's 
conception of persons, I will argue that feminist contentions fail on two accounts. In this 
chapter, it will be demonstrated that feminist claims are largely based on theoretical 
misinterpretations of Rawls's conception of the self. In the next chapter, it will be shown 
that the project of gendering the self-enabling feminists to distinguish male or 
masculine attributes from female or feminine attributes-has proven highly problematic 
particularly for those feminists advancing the argument that the Rawlsian self is male or 
masculine. As a point of clarification, in presenting a rejoinder to feminist critiques, I will 
draw primarily from Rawls's material as presented in both Theory and Political 
Liberalism; thus, it should then be considered a defense of Rawls's conception of the self 
as presented in both texts. 
My interest in appraising feminists' critiques of the Rawlsian self is determining 
whether their descriptions are indeed accurate portrayals of this self. Therefore, I will not 
be concerned with the ongoing debate between feminists and liberals over an ethic of care 
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or "care-based approach" to politics versus an ethic of justice.252 While this debate has 
served as one of the central battlegrounds between liberals (proclaiming the preeminence 
of justice and rights in matters of politics) and feminists (proclaiming the superiority of 
relationships and responsibilities in matters of politics), due to the limited scope of 
inquiry I will attend only to those aspects of the debate that overlap with Rawls's 
conception of the self. 
Moral Individualism 
Based on Rawls' s depiction of the parties in the original position, feminists have 
concluded that he assumes the self can be viewed ontologically prior to social context. 
Following this assumption, feminists further contend that the Rawlsian self entails a 
metaphysical conception of the self. These twin factors have subsequently led feminists 
to argue that Rawls subscribes to an untenable brand of metaphysical individualism, not 
moral individualism. 
The paramount problem with this line of criticism stems from feminists' 
interpretation of the original position in Rawls's theory of justice. By claiming that the 
Rawlsian self is a metaphysical construct ontologically prior to its ends, feminists have 
assumed that the attributes ascribed by Rawls to parties in the original position conversely 
apply to Rawls's conception of the self. Unfortunately, feminists have not provided any 
substantive justifications for doing so. 
252
Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, 264. 
101 
As Rawls has rightly argued, this criticism is the product of a misinterpretation of 
the notion of the original position in both Theory and Political Liberalism. Rawls 
acknowledges that by employing a conception such as the original position there are 
bound to be '~certain dangers" because "its abstractness invites misunderstanding."253 For 
those viewing parties in the original position as a metaphysical conception of the self, 
however, are suffering from an unfortunate "illusion caused by not seeing the original 
position as a device of representation."254 
As a hypothetical construct, the original position is aimed at modeling our 
"considered convictions" in crafting a conception of justice. In Theory, Rawls states that 
the original position was designed to be a fair procedure capable of yielding principles of 
social justice, which "provide a way of assigning rights and duties" and "appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation."255 Similarly, in Political 
Liberalism Rawls states that "the original position as a device of representation ... models 
what we regard-here and now-as fair conditions under which the representative of free 
and equal citizens are to specify the terms of social cooperation in the case of the basic 
structure of society ."256 In either formulation, parties in the original position are 
explicitly intended to represent persons (in Theory) or persons qua citizens (in Political 
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Liberalism). They are not, as feminists would suggest, intended to represent an actual 
description of the nature or constitution of human beings. 
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Regarding the veil of ignorance, Rawls explains, that it "has no specific 
metaphysical implications concerning the nature of the self; it does not imply that the self 
is ontologically prior to the facts about persons that the parties are excluded from 
knowing."257 At any point in time, embedded and embodied persons can simply "step" 
into the original position to determine fair principles of justice in accordance with the 
restrictions modeled into the original position. "When ... we simulate beings in the 
original position," Rawls writes, "our reasoning no more commits us to a particular 
metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting in a play, say of 
Macbeth or Lady Macbeth, commits us to thinking that we are really a king or a queen 
engaged in a desperate struggle for political power. Much the same holds for role playing 
generally ."258 
Having illustrated that the original position itself does not yield a metaphysical 
conception of persons in the way feminists suggest, we may ask whether feminists were 
entirely wrong to submit that Rawls's theory entails a metaphysical conception of the self. 
While the attributes ascribed to parties do not prima facie render a metaphysical 
conception of the self, does this necessarily imply that Rawls' s theory in general is not 
built around a particularly (metaphysical) conception of the self? 
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The suggestion here is that if feminists are intending to charge Rawls's conception 
of justice as presented in Theory with subscribing to a metaphysical conception of 
persons, they should refocus their argument if it is to be at all cogent. That is, feminists 
ought to look "outside" the original position to formulate their claim of metaphysics 
instead of looking within the original position and extracting from it the attributes given 
to the parties. 
As discussed in chapter two, the original position as a device of representation 
models what Rawls considers important about people's capacities and interests. Rawls's 
theory explicitly embodies the claim that, when it comes to matters of justice, 
people should be regarded as distinct from their particular natural endowments, 
social position and ends, but possessed of a highest-order interest in their capacity 
to frame, revise and rationally pursue their conception of the good-and such a 
claim amounts to an assessment of what is important about people, what 
constitutes their well-being. 259 
It is in this sense that Rawls's theory is modeled around a particular conception 
of persons. 
Feminists should have been attempting to determine whether Rawls's modeling 
the original position in this way amounts to a metaphysical conception of persons. Since 
it looks as though one has to be thoroughly committed to Rawls's liberal understanding of 
personhood, many theorists have concluded that this amounts "to a claim about the 
metaphysical essence of people."260 
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In short, while feminists may not have been erroneous in their contention that 
Rawls affirms a metaphysics of personhood in Theory, they were inaccurate in their 
portrayal of this commitment. If feminists were to maintain that Rawls subscribes to a 
metaphysical account of persons, they need to focus on the fact that the original position 
frames a particular liberal account of persons-in which case, Rawls's metaphysical 
conception of persons encompasses more metaphysical attributes than that which is given 
to parties in the original position. 261 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls outlines a similar set of assumptions about persons, 
however, he is careful to declare that these normative claims are derived from implicitly 
shared political ideals manifest in our democratic public political culture. In shifting the 
theoretical bases of these claims, Rawls has eschewed any reliance on the metaphysical 
entanglements found in Theory and thereby is insulated from feminist charges of 
metaphysics. 
If feminists want to renew their attack on Rawls's conception of the self from the 
position taken in Political Liberalism, they must first attend to Rawls's shift from 
defending his arguments against the charge of metaphysics, to defending his argument 
against a comprehensive doctrine. In addition, feminists must consider other lines of 
argument such as questioning the basis and scope of his notion of citizen. They may want 
to question whether men and women have disparate notions of the ideal of citizenship-
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perhaps it is a masculine ideal of citizenship that is on display in Rawls's theory of 
justice. 
Individuals and Social Context 
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One of the leading planks of feminist criticisms of Rawls's conception of persons 
is that it is premised upon a brand of abstract individualism. Analogous to the Hobbesian 
"man as mushroom" notion, feminists claim that the Rawlsian self is painted as having an 
identity and conception of the good that is formed separately from--or prior to-any 
particular social context. In light of this interpretation of the Rawlsian self, feminists 
contend that the Rawlsian self is atomistic, asocial, and egoistic. Thus, Rawls necessarily 
miscasts the relationship between the individual and society. Society is depicted simply 
as an arrangement for the mutual advantage of self-interested individuals whose aims are 
inherently asocial, and whose identities and ends are presocially given. 
The above arguments are misguided on two counts. First, feminists have relied 
entirely on the description of the parties in the original position to make their claim that 
Rawls's conception of the self is based on abstract individualism. Again, feminists offer 
no rationale to explain why we should consider characteristics ascribed to parties as those 
given to Rawls's conception of persons. Second, the charge that Rawls exhibits an 
inattentiveness to social context and its relationship to persons in either Theory or 
Political Liberalism seems inaccurate. As outlined in chapter two, Rawls discusses social 
context and society at length in both presentations of his conception of justice. 
In JAF, Rawls references social factors in four specific ways. He claims human 
beings are inherently sociable. He acknowledges that social context fashions human 
desires and identities. He considers society as a cooperative undertaking amongst 
individuals. Finally, he holds society and social life as a good in themselves. 
In political liberalism, Rawls's depends extensively on social context in 
formulating his political conception of justice as fairness. By situating his notion of 
justice within a specific political context or community, Rawls's theory takes both as its 
source and content those communally-derived values and understandings on display in 
democratic society. 
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Given that Rawls recognizes the significance of social context in crafting his 
theory of justice in both JAF and political liberalism how then does this relate to his 
conception of persons? Does Rawls demonstrate that persons are not atomistic units, that 
our identities, conceptions of the good, and interests are dependent on social context and 
personal attachments, and that we are not self-interested, egoistic creatures? The answer 
to each of these questions is yes. 
In response to the feminist claim that Rawls views persons as asocial, atomistic, 
asocial units it is demonstrated both in political liberalism and JAF that Rawls attends to 
the idea that persons are embedded within a particular social context and that a person's 
identity is reflective of the matrix of social influences and personal attachments in which 
one is embedded. 
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In Theory, Rawls demonstrates his concern not only for the" social formation" of 
our conception of the good and interests, but also the way in which our "affections and 
desires" and "the way our character develops through social interaction."262 Primarily, 
this concern is exhibited in his attention to how the "social system" influences these 
aspects of a persons existence.263 In addition, Kymlicka explains that the feminist claim 
that Rawls subscribed to an atomistic conception persons based on abstract individualism 
is simply "absurd" because it "add[s] absolutely nothing to the moral argument for liberal 
politics."264 
In political liberalism, Rawls brings the issue of persons and social embeddedness 
to the forefront. Raw ls states that it is plain that 
We have no prior identity before being in society: it is not as if we came from 
somewhere but rather we find ourselves growing up in this society in this social 
position, with its attendant advantages and disadvantages, as our good or ill 
fortune would have it. .. Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of 
reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into society where we 
will lead a complete life. 265 
It is from this standpoint-as beings positioned (or embedded) within a particular social 
context-that we make decisions and deliberate over the principles of justice. 
This bring us to answer the question: Is the Rawlsian self egoistic? In Theory, 
according to feminists, Rawls's appears to invoke a form of egoism on two accounts. 
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First, Rawls' s employment of rational choice theory appears to be the explanation offered 
regarding why citizens would agree to entering society and a conception of justice in the 
first place. Second, because parties are touted as being mutually disinterested, feminist 
contend, that this necessarily invokes a form of egoism. 
On the first account: Following Theory's publication, Rawls's admitted that his 
employment of rational choice theory was misleading as it suggested that persons enter 
society (or agree to principles of justice) based on egoistic reasons of mutual advantage. 
Rawls claims that he ''should have said ... that the conception of justice as fairness uses an 
account of rational choice subject to reasonable conditions to characterize the 
deliberations of the parties as representatives of free and equal persons; and all of this 
within a political conception of justice, which is, of course, a moral conception."266 In 
political liberalism, then, Rawls clarifies that rational choice is not used as a method for 
explaining why persons would submit to the original position. 
Careful not to invoke the sort of latent egoism on display in JAF, in political 
liberalism Rawls emphatically draws a separation between the "Rational," which provides 
the basis of how parties in the original position are motivated, and the "Reasonable," 
which is the public reason citizens in a democratic society would agree to the original 
position. "Since this means that the Reasonable is prior to the Rational, and embodies a 
variety of moral concerns, including claims about what sort of political community is 
worthy of allegiance," Mulhall and Swift contend that we in turn "have no grounds for 
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regarding Rawls's use of rational choice machinery as a sign that he is an asocial 
[egoistic] individualist in the substantive sense."267 
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On the second account: The notion that Rawls's conception of persons is egoistic, 
based on his description of parties in the original position, is also groundless. As 
discussed in chapter two, there is no way to determine whether interests of parties in the 
original position are egoistic, altruistic, etc. Because the interest of parties are simply of a 
self, not in a self. 
Contrary to feminists' depiction of Rawls's conception of persons as "the 
radically individuated man-as-mushroom," Rawls does take into account the social 
embeddedness of persons.268 As Moore and others correctly argue, feminists have erred 
"in tarring Rawls with the brush of Hobbesian individualism" and "discounts the broader 
context within which Rawls places his subject, which is first and foremost a social 
order."269 Indeed, both JAF and political liberalism are attentive to social context and to 
the fact that human identities are developed within a social context. 
Equality and Moral Personality 
Feminists' contentions with Rawls's conception of equality do not deride it as a 
normative principle. In arguing for sexual equality, feminists have often appealed to the 
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notion of moral equality between the sexes. What feminists are concerned with is two 
things: whether Rawls's conception of equality can account for the "real" differences 
between men and women (e.g. reproductive capabilities) which place women at a 
disadvantage; and does equal consideration based on moral personality exclude women. 
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First, given Rawls's description of the principles of justice in both Theory and 
Political Liberalism, there is no reason to reject Rawls's notion of equality. It proves 
capable of taking into account not only gender differences that handicap women as a 
group, but also the fact that there exists a gender-structured society that has systematically 
discriminated against women because of their sex. 
In modeling the original position, Rawls has attempted to restrict factors that have 
traditionally led to gender injustices and inequality of opportunity for women. Rawls 
maintains that the "contingencies of endowment" are to be held morally arbitrary. That 
is, "no one deserves his place in the distribution of native endowment, any more than one 
deserves one's initial starting place in society. ,mo Since parties in the original position 
will not know their gender, and will have access to general knowledge about society as 
gender-biased, Rawls contends that parties will choose principles "to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged."271 Parties, cognizant of the existing gender prejudices in 
contemporary social institutions, would not choose principles discriminatory against one 
gender. Thus, the distribution of basic social goods (necessary for equal opportunity) 
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would not be based on natural endowments which could therein favor one sex over the 
other. A theory supporting gender-biased institutions and patriarchal gender divisions 
that place women at a disadvantage would be inconsistent with Rawls's principles of 
justice. 
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While Rawls contends that all persons deserve equal consideration this does not 
translate-as feminists suggest-into the principle that men and women should be treated 
exactly alike when it come to matters of formal equality. Rawls's conception of equality, 
according to the difference principle, theoretically allows for men and women to be 
treated differently so that those "real" aspects that undermine equality between the sexes 
can be accounted for. Accordingly, there is no reason to assume that Rawls's theory of 
justice would be insensitive to gender differences. 
The second contention feminists have directed at Rawls's notion of equality arises 
from its dependence on moral personality. Consonant with the definition in Theory, 
Rawls states in Political Liberalism that "[a] sense of justice is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes 
the fair terms of social cooperation's."272 (I will treat feminists contentions with Rawls's 
"sense of justice" here, and a conception of the good in the next section.) 
Feminist contentions with Rawls's "sense of justice" stems primarily from 
Gilligan's "two voice" thesis (also dubbed the "connection thesis") which contends that 
men's moral reasoning is based on a sense or "ethic of justice" while women's is based 
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on an of "ethic of care."273 As has been noted, Gilligan has been broadly interpreted as 
suggesting "that women's morality is concrete and contextual rather than abstract; that it 
is nonprinciples rather than principles; that it is personal rather than impersonal; that it 
motivates through care rather than through awareness of duty; and that it is structured 
around responsibilities rather than rights."274 
While the empirical evidence alone effectively undercuts feminist arguments that 
there exists notable psychological differences between men and women which manifests 
in two different moral dispositions (which will be discussed in the following chapter) 
many theorists have pointed to a second problem: that is, they have questioned the 
potential of an "ethic of care" (versus an "ethic of justice") in providing a viable 
alternative for selecting principles of justice by which to order society. While I will not 
treat this at length for reasons explained at the outset, many theorists have concluded: ( 1) 
an "ethic of care" and an "ethic of justice" converge on many points so that an "ethic of 
care" collapses into an "ethic of justice" in many ways; and (2) an ethic of care is simply 
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not a plausible alternative by which to order society where persons are not exclusively 
connected in personal relations of care and face-to-face contact.275 
Conceptions of the Good, Rational Plans, and Conflicting Interests 
Feminist contentions with Rawls's conception of the good take two forms. First, 
feminists argue that his conception of the good does not comprehend the way in which it 
is influenced by social context. Given that this contention has already been addressed, it 
is the second contention that will be of interest: that is, feminists argue that Rawls's 
conception of the good does not include personal attachments and other persons as 
objects of a self's conception of the good. 
In Theory, Rawls does not explicitly account for the way in which a person can 
have as their conception of the good another person. However, in Political Liberalism, 
he amends this. Rawls states that it is clear that a conception of "the good normally 
consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want to 
realize for their own sake, as well as attachments to other persons and loyalties to various 
groups and associations. "276 
With regard to Rawls's assumption that parties in the original position are rational 
in selecting their life plans, feminists have questioned Rawls's use of rationality (i.e., 
rational choice theory). Parties are rational, Rawls states, if they "schedule their more 
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important endeavors and allocate their various resources (including those of mind and 
body, time and energy) so as to pursue their conception of the good over a complete life, 
if not in the most rational, then at least in a sensible (or satisfactory), way."277 This 
characterization of rationality, however, does not seem to be a bone of contention for 
feminists. 
What feminists appear to be disagreeing with is Rawls's methodology on the 
whole. That is, the way in which Rawls's derives principles of justice through the 
employment of an abstract, hypothetical construct is questionable. Thus, the manner 
feminists object to Rawls's methodology is that it is gender-biased concept. 
Unfortunately, feminists rely heavily on the empirical claim that men and women reason 
differently in generating their argument against Rawls's methodology. Again, as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, there exists no conclusive empirical evidence that 
demonstrates men are more adroit at making moral decisions based on hypothetical 
situations, and women are more apt to make moral decisions based on concrete, 
contextual situations. If this is the case, then, feminists argument against Rawls's 
methodology along gender lines collapses. 
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Lastly, feminists have questioned Rawls's assumption that there will inevitably be 
conflicting interests, instead they suggest that persons are inherently social and other-
oriented. As indicated, Rawls does not present a conception of persons that are asocial, 
egoists prone to hostility in competing for resources in society. Feminists have 
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gratuitously interpreted Rawls's notion of conflicting visions of the good to mean that 
persons are naturally self-interested individuals inclined to aggressive, asocial behavior. 
This was not what was intended by Rawls. 
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By claiming that persons will necessarily come into conflict with each other in 
society, what Rawls is referring to is that because people have different conceptions of 
the good, and because they want to secure those social resources requisite to obtain their 
good, there will exist a certain amount of conflict in society. In Political Liberalism, 
Rawls states that a "political culture of a democratic society is always marked by a 
diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. "278 
Given the fact that people exist in a society that allows persons to form, revise and 
purpose their conception of the good they are not all going to do so in the same fashion. 
However, these differences do not have to manifest armed conflict, violent 
behavior, or aggression as feminists imply. When Rawls speaks of persons having 
different and conflicting conceptions of the good, he simply means that there are those in 
society who hold feminist conceptions of the good alongside those who maintain 
misogynistic conceptions of the good. 
Freedom, Liberty and Autonomy 
For the most part, feminists' contentions with Rawls's conception of freedom, 
liberty and autonomy arise from their belief that he does not situate these concepts within 
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a social context, or ground these concepts on a relational sense of selves. Feminists argue 
that people only exercise autonomy and freedom within a particular society, within a 
particular community, and within a particular web of intimate personal relations. 
Given the previous discussion on social context, it appears that feminist 
contentions are erroneous. Rawls's commitment to freedom and autonomy presupposes 
that that individuals exist within a particular social context and hold a variety of personal 
attachments. 
Freedom, for Rawls, is a matter of acting within a particular social milieu in 
which persons find themselves embedded. As Kymlicka elaborates: "Liberal 
individualism is ... an insistence on respect for each individual's capacity to understand 
and evaluate her own actions, to make judgments about the value of the communal and 
cultural circumstances she finds herself in."279 Freedom as a normative conception is not 
valued in and of itself; rather, it is simply an instrumental prerequisite for persons 
desiring to pursue their own visions of the good. 280 
The fact that JAF takes account of social context in many ways undermines 
feminists' contentions that freedom is not viewed within a social environment. In 
political liberalism, Rawls presents an even more situated sense of freedom. As 
inhabitants of a democratic political society our belief that we are all free and equal, 
manifests itself in three respects: First, as having the moral power to form, to revise, and 
279Ibid., 254. 
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rationally to pursue a conception of the good; second, as being self-authenticating sources 
of valid claims; and third, as capable of taking responsibility for their ends."281 In this 
sense, the notion of freedom is derived from our communal existence. 
With regard to autonomy, as suggested in chapter two, Rawls's conception of 
autonomy can be considered "situated" or "embedded" autonomy both in JAF and 
political liberalism. For Rawls, exercising autonomy in not a matter of separating or 
abstracting one's self from personal attachments and existing social influences (as it is 
logically inconceivable). Rather, Rawls's liberal autonomy is situated within a particular 
context, which "involves critical reflection on inherited values, personal commitments, 
and based good, not a flight from and abandonment of them"; moreover, it "engages our 
understanding and responsibility at a deep level by engaging the capacity critically to 
reflect upon moral and personal identity, itself already constituted by projects plans, 
commitments, and strong evaluations."282 
In short, in both JAF and political liberalism Rawls's conception of freedom, 
liberty, and autonomy seems to parallel feminist arguments for relational autonomy and 
freedom based on a relational description of the self. 
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Conclusion 
By way of this evaluation, it appears that feminist contentions with Rawls was 
based on several misinterpretations of his theory of justice. Given the fact that Rawls 
attends to social context and personal attachments, it appears that Rawls's conception of 
the self is nearer to feminists relational self than their version of the separate self 
characterized as the Raw lsian self. Indeed, we find that feminists' conception of the 
relational self and Rawls's conception of the self are not necessarily at cross-purposes as 
feminist would have us believe. 
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On the matter of which conception of justice proved the most capable of 
deflecting feminists' contentions, I think that political liberalism is best suited to counter 
such claims. While JAF does make a puissant claim that persons are sociable creatures, 
political liberalism better attends to social context, personal attachments in a persons 
conception of the good, and deflecting charges of rational egoism. Nevertheless, both 
formulations of Rawls's theory of justice have the theoretical resources to respond to, and 
counter, feminist critiques of the Rawlsian self. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: 
PROBLEMATICS OF GENDERING THE SELF 
In the wake of feminists' abandoning their "focus on the similarities between 
individual men and women," much of contemporary feminist scholarship has been 
devoted to the enterprise of articulating the differences between the sexes.283 Indeed 
many feminists have attempted to model a collection of attributes which women as a 
group share in common-whether it be based on women's psychology, "essence, nature, 
biology, or universal social position" and so on-that ultimately distinguishes them from 
men.284 
This project of generating a fixed set of attributes, traits, characteristics, moral 
dispositions, and the like, unique to women's gender identity has garnered much support 
from feminist scholars, particularly from relational feminists. Not only has this 
undertaking held out the possibility that there exists "real" and discernible differences 
between the sexes, but also that these differences could be cataloged for the purposes of 
gendering the self. 
283Williams, 110. 
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Of late this project of formulating an "essence" of womanhood has become 
increasingly suspect, however, particularly among feminists influenced by postmodern 
thought. While this group of feminists seem reluctant to abandon the notion that there 
exist differences between men and women, and that gender influences a person's identity 
to some degree, they argue that gender is in no way the primary determinant of identity. 
Gender is simply one facet of a person's multi-faceted identity, and it intersects with a 
whole host of other characteristics such as class, race, ethnicity, personal experiences, etc. 
Regardless of how feminists go about gendering the self, their capability to do so 
is of significance here, for it enables them to determine whether Rawls' s conception of 
the self is gendered. If feminists cannot clearly demarcate gender differences between 
men and women, because the division between the sexes is blurred or inconsequential, 
then feminists cannot conversely make the claim that the Rawlsian self is gendered one 
way or the other. Thus, the feminist claim that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine 
self would collapse. 
The aim of this chapter, then, is to explore the potential of three different 
feminists' approach to gendering the self. In reviewing each of these paths to gendering 
the self, I will evaluate the potential each has for gendering the self, and what bearing this 
has on feminists' critiques of Rawls's conception of the self. In summation of the thesis, 
I will provide a final answer to the question of wt.~ther feminiJts are correct in their 
assertion that the Rawlsian self is a male or masculine self. 
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Relational Feminism 
Relational feminism's approach to gendering the self is primarily defined by 
several influential psychological and psychoanalytic works on gender studies, which have 
aimed at demonstrating gender identity differences based on contrasting psychosexual 
development. By virtue of the fact that men and women's paths to psychosexual 
development are divergent, relational feminists contend that men and women have 
disparate attributes and moral orientations. 
For the most part, relational feminists base their claim of gender differences on 
the works of Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Juliet Mitchell, and Carol 
Gilligan.285 Of these theorists, however, Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice, has 
proved to be the most influential and widely received theory supporting women and 
men's difference in contemporary feminist political discourse. 
Gilligan's work has been broadly regarded as an undertaking challenging the 
Freudian notion that women do not have as well-developed a sense of justice as men. In 
critiquing the work of Lawrence Kohl berg's theory of moral development, which expands 
Jean Piaget's popular "theory of cognitive growth," Gilligan presented a contrasting 
vision of women's moral development. In so doing, Gilligan submitted that "Kohl berg's 
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results were sex-biased against a moral orientation based on care, in contrast to his 
position of a justice orientation as the goal for mature moral development. "286 
Gilligan believed that she had "discovered" that women and men have disparate 
conceptions of morality, two different moral "voices." As highlighted previously, 
Gilligan explains that: "The moral imperative ... [for] women is an injunction to care, a 
responsibility to discern and alleviate the 'real and recognizable trouble' of this world. 
For men, the moral imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of 
others and thus to protect from interference the rights to life and self-fulfillment."287 
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Women form moral decisions based on a socio-historical context, or on particular 
"social contingencies", suggests Gilligan. 288 Men, on the other hand, are more apt to 
make moral decisions based on "hypothetical dilemmas" or universal abstractions. Men 
are better able to extract themselves "from the history and psychology of their individual 
lives and separate the moral problem from the social contingencies of its possible 
occurrence. "289 
Furthermore, Gilligan argued that women's relationships with others were based 
on an "ethic of care," while men's relationships with others were based on an "ethic of 
rights" or an "ethic of justice." Here women's conception of the self emphasizes the way 
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in which moral agent's often eschew formal rights, and instead focus on the cultivation of 
intimate personal connections based on responsibilities, nurturance, selflessness and 
empathy; whereas men emphasize a moral agents aptitude in acting autonomously and 
separately according to formal principles of justice and universal rights. 
In claiming that women's morality was based on an ethic of care, while men's 
morality was based on an ethic of justice, then, Gilligan suggests that women's views of 
the self are relational. In contrast, men view the self as separate, independent and 
autonomous. Thus, "the contrast between a self defined through separation and a self 
delineated through connection, between a self measured against an abstract ideal of 
perfection and a self assessed through particular activities of care, becomes clear": the 
female gendered self views moral decisions through the activities of connection and care 
for others and the male gendered self views moral decisions through the application of 
abstract, universal principles of justice and rights.290 
Though Gilligan's study was a work in moral psychology, feminist political 
theorists have made extensive use of Gilligan's research in their critique of the liberal 
self. 291 (Many of the critiques targeting Raw ls' s conception of the self in chapter three 
were directly inspired by Gilligan's research on the so-called differences between men 
and women.) The reason for this, according to Cass Sunstein, is that 
Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral development is closely connected with 
prominent approaches to questions of social justice. If Kohl berg's theory of 
290Ibid., 35. 
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development is based on male norms, and ignore an important alternative, the 
same may be true of (to take a not entirely random example) contractarian theories 
of politics. Thus, Gilligan's "ethic of care" is opposed, in much feminist work, to 
the 'ethic of justice" associated with social contract theory, most notably that of 
John Rawls.292 
Although one can speculate that Rawls would reject such a connection, Kohlberg has 
nonetheless drawn a parallel between his highest stage of moral development and Rawls's 
notion of parties in the original position.293 
Gilligan's popularity among feminists critiquing liberal conceptions of the self 
then seems attributable to two things. Gilligan appears to have finally provided empirical 
evidence in favor of associating particular "themes" and characteristics with female 
gender identity.294 Moreover, as Diana Meyers and Eva Fender Kittay suggest, 
"Gilligan's work on moral development purports to offer empirical evidence ... that 
undercuts standard [liberal] assumptions about moral autonomy, moral principles and the 
universality of moral doctrines."295 
The employment of Gilligan's research to gender the self, however, is 
significantly problematic for feminists on several accounts. First, Gilligan claims that she 
is not attempting to ascribe traits along gender lines. Though relational feminists have 
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considered Gilligan's work as outlining a set of gender-based characteristics applicable to 
women, Gilligan herself argues to the contrary. Gilligan states, 
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its 
association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through 
women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute, 
and the contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to highlight a 
distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem of interpretation 
rather than to represent a generalization about either sex. 296 
Despite Gilligan's claim that she was attempting to uncover a pattern of care in 
moral reasoning, however, relational feminists and critics alike have correctly regarded 
Gilligan's research as an attempt to "account for care levels or care development... 
characterized by gender rather than theme."297 The assumption that Gilligan's implicit 
intention was to articulate generalizations about gender along the lines of distinct 
moralities, rather than uncovering a gender-neutral theme of care, is based on several 
factors. 
One factor was the type of issues Gilligan raised in her interviews, and who it was 
she interviewed. For instance, on a study of abortion, Gilligan posed questions to 
women, which she did not pose to men. Another factor was the fact that Gilligan was 
inattentive to the differences between women based on age, race, class, and individual 
particularity. This has led critics to challenge her claim that she did not intend to link 
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different moral voices to a specific sex, because it appears as though she was preoccupied 
with identity differences only along only gender lines.298 
Another factor, one which Bill Puka points out, is that Gilligan's own statements 
suggest that her future objective was to uncover differences between men and women's 
moral judgments. Gilligan states that her 
findings were gathered at a particular moment in history, the sample was small, 
and women were not selected to represent a larger population. These constraints 
preclude the possibility of generalization and leave to further research the task of 
sorting out the different variables of culture, time, occasion, and gender. 
Additional longitudinal studies of women's moral judgments are needed in order 
to refine and validate the sequence describe.299 
It appears here as though Gilligan is again concerned with generalizing gender-based 
differences, rather than uncovering a gender-neutral theme of care. 
Given the above factors, Gilligan's book is generally read by feminists and critics 
as making the following claims: 
The first is the empirical claim that women and men, as a matter of fact, differ in 
their approaches to moral reasoning, with women emphasizing care and men 
justice. The second is the value claim that since an ethics of care is at least equal 
to, and perhaps better than, an ethics based on fairness, moral theory-which has 
traditionally emphasized justice and ignored or trivialized caring relationships-
ought to be restructured to take account of the importance of caring. 300 
Our interest is in the first claim, because unless it is validated-that is, an ethic of care it 
associated with womanly attributes-the second claim could be discussed in a gender-
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neutral way. This brings us to the second problem: Is Gilligan's empirical claim 
conclusive? 
From the outset, many theorists have raised serious objections to Gilligan's 
methodology. In summarizing these objections, the empirical data Gilligan employs in 
formulating her thesis is suspect in the following ways: First, the "all-female sample" 
that Gilligan used in formulating a theory regarding the differences between men and 
women does not include an adequate study of men in which to base her conclusions. The 
salient question to be asked is how does Gilligan justify making claims about men's 
morality when they were not included in sample groups and given the same questions as 
women?301 Second, Gilligan, according to Puka, used "open-ended interviews [where] 
respondents emitted only those dilemmas they found personally salient."302 Third, 
Gilligan interviewed only a small number of people, which was not enough quantitative 
data to formulate a credible argument. 303 Fourth, Gilligan did not take into account 
individual differences among women. For example, samples drew on too wide a range of 
ages in some of her studies. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, "Gilligan never actually 
observed women go through the level of care ... Rather Gilligan reconstructs the sequence 
of development conceptually in her book, by glimpsing a small interval of development in 
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eight respondents."304 Lastly, critics have argued that Gilligan's presentation of the data 
is confusing. Luria explains "Gilligan does not draw a clear line between theoretical 
speculation and discussion of data and slips from hunch, example, or metaphor to 'proven 
fact. ,,,30s 
Based on these methodological flaws alone, critics have concluded that Gilligan's 
empirical evidence probably do not support her thesis. Consequently, many have argued 
that Gilligan simply "oversimplified the case [for two separate moralities] and 
overinterpreted the data," and that once "better controls are used the difference between 
the sexes are more leveled."306 Relational feminists, however, continue to insist that 
there are gender-based differences between men and women. The question thus remains 
is there any empirical truth to these arguments? 
Though its has been over a decade since Gilligan published her findings "there is 
not a consensus in the psychological literature either on whether females and males 
reason differently regarding morals and, by extension, politics, or on why they do so 
when gender differences in moral reasoning have been observed."307 What seems to be 
the consensus, Deborah Rhode maintains, is that 
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most empirical studies of moral development do not disclose significant gender 
distinction. Nor does related research reveal the kind of strong sex-linked 
differences that relational feminism would suggest; there are few psychological 
attributes in which the sexes consistently vary. For even those attributes, such as 
aggression, spatial ability and helping behavior, gender typically accounts for only 
about 5 per cent of the variance, the similarities between men and women are far 
greater than the disparities, and small statistical distinctions do not support 
sweeping sex-based dichotomies.308 
Making a similar conclusion, Muriel Bebeau and Mary Brabeck have tested 
Gilligan's thesis in light of recent research on gender differences. What they found was 
that "'[t]o date, the literature examining gender differences in moral reasoning as defined 
by Kohlberg's theory do not support Gilligan's claims."309 While there is much evidence 
to suggest that "abstract reason are perceived as masculine traits", the "evidence from 
observation of behaviors does not support the stereotype."310 Extensive testing of both 
men and women showed that "females use conceptions of justice in making moral 
judgment as often as their male counterparts."311 
Nancy Eisenberg, Richard Fabes, and Cindy Shea conducted another review of the 
literature on gender-based differences in moral reasoning.312 What they found was that 
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Based on the existent empirical data, it is not clear whether there are gender 
differences in empathy, sympathy, and personal distress. Females tend to report 
more of the emotional responses but they do not differ markedly from males in 
nonverbal and physiological reactions ... The difference that does occur in 
nonverbal indexes favor females, although it is possible that males simply mask or 
inhibit their sympathetic and empathic reactions more than females. Given the 
lack of difference in the physiological data as well as the nonverbal and self-report 
data indicating more responsibility by females, we hypothesize that males and 
females do not differ significantly in their tendencies to react emotionally to 
other's emotional states (i.e., in empathy).313 
While Eisenberg, Fabes, and Shea obtained some evidence to suggest that women 
exhibited more other-oriented behavior in attending to emotional needs than men, the 
differences they located were not great "and account for relatively small amount of the 
variance in individuals' emotional responding and moral reasoning."314 
At this point in time, it is reasonably safe to assume that there exists little 
empirical evidence to suggest that men and women have different gender-based 
approaches to morality. Since this is the case, why have relational feminists and others 
continued to argue that there exists "real" differences between men and women? 
Lawrence Walker hypothesizes that the notion that there are stereotypical 
differences between the sexes is more mythic in origin that empirical.315 "It is clear that 
women have a greater reputation for altruism and empathy than do men, and that women 
accept its validity," claim Catherine Greeno and Eleanor Maccoby, even though "studies 
313Jbid., 136. 
314Ibid., 139-140. 
315Lawrence Walker, "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical 
Review," in An Ethic of Care, ed. Mary Jeanne Larrabee (New York: Routledge, 1993), 176. 
131 
do not show" this to be the case.316 While men and women may intuitively perceive there 
to be a difference between the male and female conception of the self, there is no 
empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. 
Accordingly, the third problematic presents itself: that is, many feminists are 
skeptical of relational feminists' project to "rehabilitate traditional stereotypes as 
'women's voice,' [because it] fails to come to terms with the extent to which the gender 
stereotypes were designed to marginalize women."317 Relational feminists have not 
questioned the validity of these stereotype of women's gender identity; they simply want 
to revalue the so-called feminine virtues traditionally linked to women. 
On this point, Joan Williams claims that Gilligan's other voice parallels the 
patriarchal view of the "pre-modern stereotype of woman" whose virtue and rationality 
were prominent in Victorian times.318 We should be skeptical of the reliance on intuition 
of gender difference on display in relational feminism, warn Greeno and Maccoby, since 
"women have been trapped for generations by people's willingness to accept their own 
intuitions about the truth of gender stereotypes."319 
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Finally, feminists have criticized relational feminists for employing an essentialist 
argument for gendering the self since in defining an "essential feminine subject" this 
"involves positing an essential, asocial core that all women, qua women, share. ,mo 
Because of relational feminists tendency to link women's nature exclusively to some 
aspect of her biology or physiology (such as childbearing) to explain women's identity, 
they have "generally failed to address variation across culture, class, race, ethnicity, age 
and sexual orientation."321 Accordingly, relational feminism has fallen to charges of 
essential ism, which many feminists believe is fundamentally exclusionary. 
In conclusion, feminist commentators have argued that relational feminists' 
conception of the gendered self fails on two accounts. First, they erroneously assume that 
the experiences of one group of women (e.g. white, middle-class, heterosexual) is by 
extension the same for all women; thereby, they do not adequately acknowledge the 
important differences between women. Second, relational feminists overstate the case 
that gender exclusively constitutes women's identity. 322 
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Cultural Feminism 
Cultural feminism lies at something of a crossroads between relational and 
postmodern feminism. Both relational and cultural feminists want to rely on a relational 
conception of the self. However, the relational feminists emphasize "women's essential 
connectedness to other human beings," while the latter emphasizes women's sense of self 
as "a product of cultural forces alone."323 
In attempting to evade the recurrent charges of essentialism plaguing the work of 
relational feminists, cultural feminists have endeavored to back away from this type of 
argument and claim that women are relational selves to the extent that they are embedded 
within a particular culture. Contra relational feminism, they argue that women are not 
innately or naturally relational selves; rather, women view themselves as relational selves 
based on certain cultural influences. 
For cultural feminist, women's gender identities are "conceive[d] in purely social 
terms," explains Elizabeth Grosz, and refer "to the attributions of invariant social 
categories, function, and activities to which all women in all cultures are assigned."324 In 
short, the concept of the feminine gendered self is a socially constituted figure whose 
attributes are fixed based on a particular class of gender-based experiences. 
Given that women's gender identity is defined by activities and attributes present 
within a culture, we may ask what culture entails for feminists. Culture, delineates Iris 
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Young, "includes the symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportment's, stories, and so 
on through which people express their experience and communicate with one another. "325 
These cultural images in turn become attached to particular persons, actions, institutions, 
behaviors, etc., in society. Accordingly, a given culture articulates what constitutes 
femininity and masculinity. For cultural feminists, "The culture identifies masculine with 
the values associated with individualism-self-sufficiency, competition, separation, the 
form equality of rights. The culture identifies women, on the other hand, with the values 
associated with community-affective relations of care, mutual aid and cooperation."326 
To articulate the way these cultural symbols of gender have become internalized 
in women's gender-identity-that is, how they describe women's sense of self--cultural 
feminist commonly rely on Gilligan's research; as well as the works of Chodorow, 
Dinnerstein, Mitchell.327 For instance, Hirschmann (a social constructivist or cultural 
feminist) relies explicitly on Gilligan's psychological studies to make her argument that 
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women's identities are constructed by the dominant culture, and thus women have a 
particular gender identity. 
While cultural arguments about women's gender identity may seem more 
appealing to feminists wishing to dodge essentialism, there are two fundamental 
problems. First, many feminists argue that cultural feminists do not escape the charge of 
essentialism. Hekman explains that cultural feminists "argue that subjects are essentially 
socially constructed, that is, they want to replace the essentialism of liberal individualism 
with an equally essentialist view of the subject as socially conducted."328 
Second-and more importantly-cultural feminists, in order to articulate gender 
differences between men and women and account for the different conceptions of the self, 
almost inevitably end up referencing psychological accounts to demonstrate this. Though 
theorists such as Hirschmann claim to use the work of Gilligan simply to decipher 
cultural manifestations of gender identity, they do not successfully evade the problem 
hindering relational feminists' accounts of gender difference: there is no empirical 
evidence to prove that men and women differ in their moral reasoning capacities and 
sense of self. 329 
Like relational feminists, what cultural feminists are doing is simply recounting 
society's mythic notions of womanhood to embody the gendered self. "[C]ultural 
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feminist reappraisal [of feminine characteristics]", Linda Alcoff states, "construes 
women's passivity as her peacefulness, her sentimentality as her proclivity to nurture, her 
subjectiveness as here advanced self-awareness, and so forth. Cultural feminism have not 
challenged the defining of woman but only that definition given by men."330 
Accordingly, the cultural feminists attempt at gendering the self does not present a better 
alternative than that offered by the relational feminists. 
Postmodern Feminists 
The term "postmodern feminism" should be regarded less as a fixed and coherent 
brand of feminism than as a broader philosophical movement which has recently 
influenced feminist thought; particularly, feminism's approach to gendering the self. 
While some feminists have rejected this postmodern trend outright for its destructive 
methodology, many feminists (postmodern or not) embrace postmodernism as a potential 
corrective to the essentialist theorizing of relational and cultural feminism. 
This aside, treating postmodern feminists as a group is difficult. In part, this 
stems from postmodern feminists' inclination for "opacity, viewing clarity as one of the 
seven deadly sins of the phallologocentric order."331 While postmodern feminist share 
some elements of similarity-that is, "they share what seems a common desire to think 
330
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non binary, nonoppositional thoughts"-beyond this postmodern feminists appear to move 
along different paths.332 
One theme postmodern feminists' arguments converge, however, is over an 
approach to gendering the self. Unlike relational and cultural feminists, postmodern 
feminists question the whole notion of "subjectivity" and in defining a concept or 
category of women. 333 Postmodern feminists have accordingly attacked relational and 
cultural feminists' attempts to identify a particular set of attributes common to all woman, 
as it reinforces binary thinking. 
Instead, postmodern feminists want to embody the self through a concept of 
"positionality." The differences between cultural and relational feminists' projects at 
gendering the self, explains Alcoff, and the postmodern feminists' project, is this: 
When the concept "woman " is defined not by a particular set of attributes but by 
a particular position, the internal characteristics of the person thus identified are 
not denoted so much as the external context within which that person is situated. 
The external situation determines the person's relative position ... The essentialist 
definition of woman makes her identity independent of her external situation: 
since her nurturing and peaceful traits are innate they are ontologically 
autonomous of her position with respect to others or to the external historical and 
social conditions generally. The positional definition, on the other hand, makes 
her identity relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation that includes a 
network of elements involving others, the objective economic conditions, cultural 
and political institutions and ideologies, and so on.334 
332
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Postmodern feminists argue that women and men's identities are reflective of their 
position within the matrix of social relations; conversely, their identity is always in a 
process of becoming. The concept of "women" can only be described within a fluid 
context; thus, it is never fixed as it changes to reflect the context in which individual 
women are embedded. 
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What postmodern feminists argue for then is a notion of "woman" as a "discursive 
subject." That is, women are constituted by cultural factors to some extent, yet they are 
also capable of constituting their own identity. The identity of woman "is the product of 
her own interpretation and reconstruction of her history, as mediated through the cultural 
discursive context to which she has access."335 
The effect of describing women in the above way departs from the notion that 
there exists an "essential" quality or set of attributes particular one sex. "Gender 
differences fa11 along a continuum, and context matters greatly in eliciting traits 
traditionally associated with women", Rhode delineates; therefore, "It is misleading to 
discuss gender-related attributes as if they can be abstracted from the distinctive social 
expectations, opportunities and hierarchies that are also linked to gender."336 Rather than 
embodying the self with universal, generalized qualities, postmodern feminists contend 
that we must look at the individual particularities of women-the position individual 
335
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women find themselves at a particular interval of their lives-to embody the self. 
Because it is altogether "misleading to try to identify traits as specifically female." 337 
Supplanting cultural and relational feminism's project of identifying an 
"essential" subject, then, postmodern feminists emphasize difference among men and 
women, and among women themselves. Gender is simply one aspect among many others 
that constitute a woman's identity, and the differences between women are beyond any 
"essential" feminine gender. Indeed, it is "the postmodern call to give up the privileging 
of gender, along with subject-centered forays into women's ways of thinking, acting, and 
reconcieving theory and politics."338 
While I consider this description of gender accurate, it manifests two problems for 
feminists gendering the self and providing a critique of the Rawlsian self along gender 
lines. First, the postmodern feminists approach to the self cannot generate an definitive 
set of attributes unique to all women. Thus, they cannot really gender the self at all. 
Second, in being unable to delimit gender differences of men and women, feminists are 
hamstrung in making the claim that the Rawlsian self illustrates attributes of a self that 
are distinctly male or masculine. If postmodern feminists do so, they would have to rely 
on an "essentialist" interpretation of the male or masculine subject. 339 
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a male or masculine subject. Indeed, postmodern feminists often make such a claim; however, I would 
contend that they do so in a theoretically inconsistent way. 
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Having reviewed three feminist approaches to gendering the self (for the purpose 
of providing a critique of the Rawlsian self) we are left with two alternatives. The first is 
to endorse the relational and cultural feminists' approach to gendering the self, which 
provides a set of gender-based attributes with which to contrast Rawls's conception of the 
self. However, as indicated earlier, this alternative is theoretically untenable based on 
empirical data alone. 
The second alternative offered by postmodern feminists is perhaps the best 
approach to the self: gender is simply one facet of a person's multi-faceted identity. 
While gender may influence a person's identity at some level and with varying degree 
among persons, it is in no way a primary determinant of a person's identity. The problem 
here is that there exists no set of gender-based attributes to gender the self since the 
division between a male or female gendered self is indeterminate. 
Postmodern feminism then does not adequately provide the theoretical tools 
necessary for claiming that the Rawlsian self is male or masculine; otherwise it would 
have to invoke a brand of Enlightenment dualism. Relying upon the relational and 
cultural attempts at gendering the self and claiming that the Rawlsian self is male or 
masculine, however, proves to be empirically indefensible. We can conclude that none of 
the feminist paths to gendering the self successfully proves that the Rawlsian self is male 
or masculine. 
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Concluding Remarks 
In the preceding pages, I have tried to explicate both Rawls's conception of the 
self (in both Theory and Political Liberalism) and feminist criticisms of the Rawlsian self 
for the purpose of evaluating the debate. In so doing, my primary aim was to bring out 
certain features of the debate, and to suggest where feminists criticisms have been 
misplaced. 
In the course of this argument, it has been shown that feminists face two tasks if 
they are to successfully criticize Rawls's conception of persons in the future. First, 
feminists must provide a better treatment of and more accurate interpretation of Rawls's 
conception of the self. Moreover, they must attend to the recent theoretical shift within 
Rawls's conception of justice-from JAF to political liberalism. 
Second, if feminists exigency is to claim that Rawls's conception of the self is a 
gender-biased construction, they will have to produce a theoretically (and empirically) 
defensible way for doing so. That is, in order to claim that the Rawlsian self is male or 
masculine, feminists must be capable of clearly articulating a self with gender-based 
attributes for the purpose of distinguishing subjects. 
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